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India has for decades professed a desire to participate in the
international system as a global power. However, India's surprisingly
equivocal reaction to the 1990 Gulf Crisis and subsequent military
conflict did not reflect these aspirations. This thesis examines Indian
foreign policy focussing on (a) changing Indian regional concerns, (b)
factors which have prevented India from achieving predominance in South
Asia, and (c) India's reactions to the Gulf War.
This analysis indicates an apparent shift in Indian priorities from
global aspirations to regional and domestic issues. The thesis suggests
a careful review of a seeming U.S. "tilt" towards India—despite what
appears to be a change in India's policies towards improving relations in
South Asia and deteriorating U . S . -Pakistan relations
—
given India's past
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In international politics, nations are judged both by what they say
and, more importantly, by what they do. Since its independence, Indian
political leaders have professed a desire to fill the power vacuum
created by the British withdrawal from the subcontinent and eventually
from the Indian Ocean. In support of these goals set by India's leaders,
she has built her military infrastructure into one of the world's
largest.
Despite India's desires, she has been prevented from increasing her
role in the Indian Ocean by events and factors beyond her capacity to
control. Additionally, problems at home and in the South Asian region
have forced her to pay more attention to local issues vice international
affairs.
India's reactions to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent
military conflict have been criticized as not in keeping with her desires
to participate in greater Indian Ocean affairs. This crisis provided her
with a unique opportunity to develop her desires as an Indian Ocean
power with vital interests in the Gulf region. However, her equivocal
statements regarding the invasion and non-military role have left her
isolated from affairs in the Middle East.
This thesis will examine India's role in the Indian Ocean and how her
desires to take a more active role have been prevented. It will look at
India's reaction to the Gulf crisis and attempt to identify reasons for
her responses. The underlying theme of this paper is that India's
inability to legitimately control affairs in South Asia—a legitimacy
based upon acceptance and compliance from other regional nations—has
forced her to set aside greater Indian Ocean aspirations to first
solidify her South Asian position.
While successive governments over the past four decades have
gradually looked inward, India has continued to present an image to the
world which placed international issues over regional problems. India's
response to the Gulf crisis—though not a fundamental change in Indian
foreign policy—is an overt demonstration that Indian concerns for the
near future are to gain its leadership role in South Asia prior to any
major involvement in affairs outside the region.
It is vital for the U.S. to examine carefully its apparent tilt
towards India—in light of India's Gulf positions and past willingness to
exert influence in South Asia. It is critical that U.S. policies keep
from enhancing India's hegemonic tendencies and, hence, the U.S. being
viewed as a partner to India's strive for regional predominance, at the
expense of other nations in the region.
II. INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL
The importance of regional superpowers, and the roles that they play
both regionally and globally, is likely to increase as competition for
influence between the United States and the Soviet Union declines.
Increasing as well will be the international concern regarding the
military capabilities of these regional actors and their willingness to
flex their muscle within their respective regions and beyond.
India is a regional power with both the capability and the desire to
project influence throughout the Indian Ocean. Since its independence in
1947 from British rule, "India has seen itself as one of the four
Superpowers along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China."
[Ref l:p.77] While the reality of this perception has eluded the Indians,
it has driven them as a nation to reach for their envisioned position in
the world order.
India's history of repeated invasions and the struggle for
independence from the British "reinforced the belief that the loss of
independence—while continuously possible—must never again be
permitted." [Ref 2: p. 1481 This has been evidenced throughout the years
since independence by an India unwilling to participate in alliances and
coalitions, unless directly serving her national interests, and much
concern over any perceived threats to her independent actions on
international affairs. For, "India's belief that its independence is
continually threatened in a variety of ways, economic and political, is
only matched by a fierce determination to prevent its loss, whatever the
costs." [Ref 2: p. 1481
India's foreign policy since 1947 has been based upon the
"establishment of India's predominance in South Asia—a predominance
whose legitimacy would be accepted by other nations in the region." [Ref
3: p. 1091 Accomplishment of this goal has been difficult for the Indians.
The other six nations in South Asia, for fear of having their actions
pressured by a powerful India, have attempted to create military and
political linkages with nations outside of South Asia. This has been
made easier by the competition for influence between the two Superpowers
and their willingness to exchange weapons and financial aid for access to
strategic positions, vis a vis each other, or even sometimes for stated
support of respective ideological beliefs. Realizing this has led the
Indians to concentrate on removing the presence of foreign forces in the
region thus leaving regional nations with little choice but to accede to
India's role in South Asia. Good relations with the Soviets and limited
strategic interest in South Asia for the U.S.—with the possible
exception of Pakistan—combined with the end of the cold war will make
this easier for India.
It is necessary to qualify the statement regarding India's foreign
policy, for though it implies a desire to establish her position in South
Asia, her leaders—specifically Nehru—had greater global aspirations for
India. While the leaders who followed Nehru spoke of these same
intentions, they were increasingly forced to pay closer attention to
regional affairs. This will be discussed later in the thesis, but it is
necessary to understand for India's initial aspirations to play a global
role have also been a factor preventing her from increasing her regional
status
.
An integral part of any recognized power is the presence of strong
and capable military forces. For many years, India has maintained a
powerful army and a rapidly developing air force, while its naval forces
have been ignored due to an inability to identify a sea-borne threat.
Though the desire for a strong navy that would show the importance of
India to the world has always been in the forefront of the minds of the
Indian elite, "this type of Naval expansion was beyond the country's
immediate resources and needs." [Ref A: p. 2021 However, "the 1971
Indo-Pakistan war, demonstrating the potential of missile armed fast
patrol boats in future regional conflicts gave the navy a mission" [Ref
5: p. 14] and "the need to protect India's growing external trade, its 200
mile exclusive economic zone and its offshore exploitation of resources
have given additional weight to arguments favoring the expansion of the
navy." [Ref 5: p. 141 In addition, "the Nixonian deployment of the
Enterprise during the 1971 war was really the straw that broke the
self-imposed restraints on Indian Naval expansion." [Ref 6: p. 381
While the presence of powerful military forces allows for projection
of influence and is paramount for true regional dominance in the Indian
Ocean, this thesis will omit a direct discussion of the development of
India's military. The reason for this omission is that regardless of
actions taken by India to develop its military forces, true predominance
in South Asia can only come from an acceptance of this position by other
regional players. It is sufficient to state that all three wings of
India's military are very sophisticated and there is considerable effort
being placed on obtaining the most advanced equipment for their use.
Hence, the first chapter of this thesis will not specifically describe
Indian unilateral actions to become a regional military power
—
given that
this is occurring and will likely continue—but instead will focus on
events and nations inside and outside the Indian Ocean which have
prevented India from realizing the goal of South Asian regional
predominance. Additionally, the final section of the chapter will
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look at India's desire to play a greater role in the Indian Ocean and
how that desire has been repeatedly thwarted by events beyond her
capability to control—forcing India to realize her limited ability to
project power outside of South Asia.
A. INDIA AND SOOTH ASIA
An emerging view in India is that she has a legitimate role in the
domestic political development of the countries which surround her.
Additionally, there is a perception that outside powers do not have
reasons for deploying forces into the Indian Ocean and any attempt to
develop influence within South Asia, through close bilateral relations,
Reference to the region of South Asia include the nations of India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.
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Any reference to the Indian Ocean region includes the entire Indian
Ocean and the adjacent seas as depicted in Indian Ocean Atlas Central
Intelligence Agency, August 1976.
will be met by Indian criticism towards the power projecting influence
and some form of punishment to the regional country. India has shown
sufficient evidence of a willingness to resort to force, economic and
military, even when not provoked. The perception by India's six
neighbors of her potential threat to their independent actions has been
the basis for an inability by the countries of South Asia to establish
sound relations.
Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, relations
between the seven states in South Asia "have been marked by deep
suspicion and antagonism, even during periods of comparatively 'normal'
interactions." [Ref 7:p.l] The British withdrawal and subsequent
Indo-Pakistan conflicts brought about a fundamental change in the power
equation in the region with India "the dominant major power, Pakistan as
a significant middle power, Bangladesh as a weak and dependent middle
power, Sri Lanka and Nepal as weak and small powers, and Bhutan and the
Maldives as mini states." [Ref 8: p. 889] This asymmetrical power
configuration has resulted in foreign policy positions by the six smaller
states being taken with total regard to a perceived threat of Indian
domination. However, with the exception of Pakistan, "whatever
reservations or suspicions the smaller states have about India, tend to
be overshadowed by the fact that they are dependent upon India in times
of crisis." [Ref 7: p. Ill
India, by virtue of its size and resources, has been the preeminent
power in the region. However, its desire for predominance in South Asian
affairs has not been forthcoming due largely to reservations by regional
actors and an unwillingness to accept a predominant position for India in
the region by outside powers. Additionally "there is plenty of
postulating by Indian academics and commentators on India's ordained
regional role." [Ref 9: p. 269] Hence, there is understandable anxiety
over India's hegemonic desires and intentions.
Though hampered during the Cold war, India's domination of South
Asian affairs is perhaps inevitable. "Regional dominance implies the
existence of local military preponderance over neighbors through the
spectrum of force, the availability of non-military instruments of
pressure (including inducement and economic coercion), the ability to
influence the consequences following upon domestic political weaknesses
in rival regional states, and a willingness to conduct a strategy of
diplomacy that places regional dominance above other objectives." [Ref
10: p. 61 India is in this position and its regional preeminence is so
substantial that it has been accepted by the outside powers "and
implicitly so by all South Asian states as well, even including
Pakistan." [Ref 10: p. 6] The gradual reduction of influence and interest
in South Asia by the U.S. and Soviet Union and improving bilateral
relations between India and China make this position only stronger and
have forced regional nations to begin accepting India's role.
The implementation of the South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) in 1983 * has opened a window by which each of the
The idea of the South Asian association of regional cooperation was
raised in 1980 by General Zia-Ur-Rahman, then president of Bangladesh.
He formally proposed a summit conference to discuss ways of promoting
relations in the region and develop a forum like ASEAN. Foreign
ministers met on August 1, 1983 and officially launched the organization.
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countries can create greater economic interdependence, and a forum for
discussion of regional and bilateral issues—though this is not an
expressed part of its basic charter. The most recent Indian governments
under VP Singh and Chandra Shekhar have made the most dramatic efforts of
any previous governments to improve relations in the region and to push
the regional organization beyond its infancy stages. At the same time
India has not given in to these nations but has cultivated their
acceptance to her position without forgoing her security interests. A
discussion of these bilateral issues that have prevented closer
cooperation amongst these nations with India and as a result India's
legitimate predominance, is the basis for the following section.
Once again it must be clarified that positive relations between
countries is a two way affair. It is not possible to just blame the six
smaller nations in the region for poor relations with India. India's
actions and overbearance on many issues have been as great a factor in
hampering closer ties as has the unwillingness by these countries to
accept India's regional role.
1 . Pakistan
Pakistan has by far been the greatest thorn in India's side.
"The confessional Muslim basis of Pakistan's birth, and the communal
nature of its partition from India in 1947, have defined India as
Pakistan's premier enemy and dictated its military expenditures and
deployments." [Ref ll:p.21 It has stood opposite India on every major
international and regional issue faced by both countries. A typical
Indian attitude about Pakistan is that of Krishna Menon, an Indian
politician whose role in the formulation of India's foreign policy was
next only to Nehru, who stated in 1964:
My belief is that Pakistan leaders looked upon Pakistan as a
first installment, thinking in terms of the English doctrine take
what you can and fight for more. They have never accepted the
Partition as final, as we did. Their main approach to the problem
was that India was theirs; India was a Muslim country historically;
the British had taken it away from them; .. .Pakistan will do anything
and everything against us.... Its aggression is not for a place, not
for Kashmir alone; the aggression is against India, against
secularism. [Ref 12: p. 279-280]
There are many in India after partition that felt Pakistan would
not survive and would again become a part of India. The partition was
heavily opposed by many—Hindu and Muslim alike—but Nehru, believing
that India would have to function as a unified country eventually,
recognized that perhaps the best way to get the British out of the
country was to accept a partition at the present. "At Simla, VK Menon
urged him to accept a quick partition in order to avert the further
spread of communal bitterness and to prepare for later reunification."
[Ref 13: p. 511 However, as these expectations have not materialized, it
is India, not Pakistan, that is more willing to accept the International
boundaries established by history and fortify relations between the two
countries. This is supported by Pakistan's continued support of rebels
in India and the two wars over Kashmir which Pakistan has initiated.
Pakistan's participation in the U.S. global defense system from
the 1950' s has brought her much in the terms of weapons and military aid.
This relationship has also helped her to forge ties with Middle Eastern
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countries, particularly evident in the 1980' s after the Soviet's invasion
of Afghanistan. The beefing up of Pakistan's military has allowed her to
maintain the capability to combat her southern neighbor and has been one
reason for India forging ties with the Soviet Bloc in order to prevent
Pakistan from gaining an edge over India. While no U.S. supplied weapons
in Pakistan have ever been used against the Soviets—with the possible
exception of Afghanistan—many have been used in two of her wars with
India.
The two countries have gone to war on three separate occasions
—
in 1947, 1965, and 1971. The 1971 conflict, resulting in the separation
of Pakistan's eastern wing and the creation of Bangladesh, radically
altered the strategic situation on the subcontinent in India's favor.
Though Pakistan continues to build its military in an effort to counter
the threat from India, she is not capable of militarily defeating India.
The likely possibility that increased tensions in the early months of
1990 might lead to another war, was very high. The biggest international
fear was the possible use of nuclear weapons most likely initiated by
Pakistan—being defeated conventionally—but also in retaliation to the
initial use by India. Both, realizing the senselessness of another war,
and combined with extreme pressure from both superpowers, extended
diplomatic efforts to prevent the escalating tensions from reaching the
point of no return. [Ref 14]
Pakistan—though officially denied—has increased its efforts to
fuel secessionist factions in Kashmir and the Punjab by training and
aiding rebels. These efforts are in an attempt to justify its existence
as a Muslim country and support the claim that minority religions cannot
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live in a "secular India." India, on the other hand, will not allow its
country once again to be divided as it was in 1947 and has denounced
Pakistan's actions as an intervention in India's internal affairs, and
has called upon the U.S. to impress upon Islamabad the importance of
refraining from such subversive action.
It would be unfair not to give India some of the credit for
hampering relations between the two countries. India has voiced repeated
concern over any Pakistani attempts to develop relations outside the
region, viewing these ties as a threat to her security. It was India,
regardless of the reasons, who violated Pakistan's sovereignty by taking
military actions in East Pakistan in 1971 . India has also been blamed
repeatedly by Pakistan for encouraging separatist tendencies in Pakistan.
While India denies these claims and blames them on an attempt from
Islamabad to draw attention away from Pakistani actions, given India's
aiding of Tamil revolutionaries in Sri Lanka, this action is surely
possible.
The biggest problem between the two countries has been the
ideological differences that first divided them as well as Pakistan's
desires to prove that it was equal to or better than India. While,
Pakistan's relations with the U.S. and the Gulf countries has brought it
much military aid, neither of these two have taken staunch pro-Pakistani
positions—by continuing the aid—during times of war with India. Thus,
as her strategic importance to the U.S. has declined with the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, and her restricted role in the defense of
Saudi Arabia has called into question her importance to moderate Arab
regimes, Pakistan for the first time in its history is faced with the
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dilemma of either improving its relations with India and South Asia or
risk isolating itself from much of the world. Pakistan must accept the
realization that her future as well as her roots lie in South Asia.
The Pakistani's have a long standing friendship with
China—supported heavily by the Chinese as a counter to the Indo-Soviet
ties as well as a fear during the 1980' s that the Soviets would move from
Afghanistan into Pakistan to surround China IRef 13: p. 681. The improving
Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Soviet relations will reduce Pakistan's
position of advantage in Beijing. Additionally, the carrot of most
favored nation status which China enjoys with the U.S. and is currently
being reviewed in the U.S. Congress could be an overriding factor to
reduced Chinese military assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan has also had
good relations with Iran and the Gulf States. Yet, Iran's new found
neutrality and a desire to play a greater role in Gulf security will
likely keep her from overtly aiding Pakistan in its military development.
The Gulf countries are trying to create a security system to counter
threats from inside and outside the Gulf. It is unlikely that these
countries will take Pakistan's side in a conflict against India—except
possibly if India initiates the situation—as this would likely require
the emerging security system as a whole to concur.
The recent bilateral agreement in February 1991 between India and
Pakistan to keep from attempting a preemptive strike upon each others
nuclear facilities and the positive efforts by both Prime Ministers at
the SAARC conference in November 1990 are the first step towards improved
relations. While this agreement largely nullifies U.S. attempts to
prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent and may be
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cause for a readjustment of U.S. policy towards both countries, regarding
their nuclear programs, it does help to create better relations between
the two. That these relations must improve is not a given. However,
SAARC is an acceptable tool in creating confidence building measures to
at least become more economically interdependent and learn to coexist
with respect for each others' sovereignty. As the preeminent regional
power, it is vital that India who is surely not without blame for these
relations, be willing to accept Pakistan's ties outside the region for
the creation of a better atmosphere for bilateral relations.
2. Sri Lanka
Ties between India and its island neighbor Sri Lanka have never
been very close. While, "there have been occasional periods of tension
in their relationship, for the most part both sides have adopted
'low-posture' rather than confrontationist strategies toward each other."
[Ref 16: p. 57] Yet both have followed distinctively different policies
regarding the security in the region. Good relations between the two
have been hampered by continuing Sri Lankan attempts to improve relations
with both superpowers as well as other countries capable of providing her
with military aid. Her reasons for encouraging the presence of outside
powers has been to contribute to "Colombo's capacity to adopt more
flexible policies toward its giant neighbor to the north." [Ref 16: p. 581
Additionally, problems have been created by India's aid to the Tamil
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minority in Sri Lanka as well as training and harboring Tamil
revolutionaries in secret camps in India. [Ref 9: p. 275]
One area on which India and Sri Lanka agree has been the call for
declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. At the third non-aligned
conference at Lusaka in 1970, India and Sri Lanka emphasized the need for
this declaration and "the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1971,
declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for all times to come." [Ref
17: p. 238) However, Sri Lanka's actions have not always been supportive
of her calls for this declaration.
Regarding U.S. involvement, the strategic value of an ex-naval
base at Trinconalee and an air force base at Katunayake were very high on
U.S. interests in the 1970' s. The U.S. made a tempting offer of a $600
million oil refinery in exchange for greater use of these two facilities.
In 1981, the Sri Lankan government proposed leasing out 100 oil storage
tanks lying idle since World War II to the U.S. based Coastal Corporation
as an oil storage terminal complete with refueling facilities. While
seen by Sri Lanka as an attempt to increase foreign exchange, this was
viewed by India as another attempt to turn over the Tricomalee Base to
the U.S. for naval facilities. The U.S. and Sri Lanka also signed an
agreement to expand the Voice of America relay station at Chican in 1986,
though heavily opposed by India. [Ref 18: p. 157]
However, despite India's anxiety, the major powers have limited
their attempts to gain influence In Sri Lanka and "... it appeared that
there was a greater eagerness on the part of Colombo to barter away her
strategic advantages ... for security guarantee against a perceived threat
from India." [Ref 19:p.901 The U.S. and the Soviets have both stayed
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clear of Sri Lanka since the escalation of ethnic violence in the 1980 's
due to relations with India and even more importantly, "... the roots and
conduct of the Sri Lankan crisis have next to nothing to do with the
Great Powers " [Ref 20: p. 1167]
Problems in Sri Lanka since the early 1980' s have heightened
Indian interests in that country. The increase in military activity by
insurgent groups, known collectively as the "Tamil Tigers", and the fear
that separatist desires of the Tamils might fuel similar problems in
India has been cause for concern in New Delhi. The influx of masses of
Tamil refugees—who have an historical linkage to Indians in the southern
state of Tamilnadu—has also increased Indian anxiety over the situation
in Sri Lanka. In addition, renewed attempts by Colombo to seek military
assistance and counterinsurgency training from outside the
region—including the U.S., Soviets, and Chinese—and actual training
received from agencies in Israel and Pakistan have been viewed as
unnecessary by India as well as a threat to India's security environment.
That this assistance might be used to gain influence in Sri Lanka was
paramount in Indian fears. Conversely, there has been an even greater
fear in Sri Lanka that Tamil concerns in India would bring an Indian
intervention into Sri Lanka's internal affairs.
Indian mediation efforts in hopes of a peaceful solution to the
ethnic problems have been undercut by repeated statements against India
by Sri Lankan leaders. Continued persecution of Tamil civilians and an
economic blockade of the northern region where they are a majority,
resulted in a great deal of pressure upon the central Indian government
to act in order to prevent further harm to the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
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After attempts by India to ship humanitarian supplies into the city of
Jaffna were blocked, India provided a true example of its power and
willingness to exercise that power, by air dropping provisions on June 5,
1987 with five AN-32 freighters escorted by 4 Mirage 2000. While a clear
violation of Sri Lankan air space—this step was justified in India as a
humanitarian action. [Ref 211
The Indo-Sri Lankan accord signed in July 1987 appeared to be a
time for approachment between the two countries. The 40-50 thousand
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were sent in hopes of maintaining the
integrity of the island nation while gaining some degree of autonomy for
the Tamils. Many of the Tiger Groups, based and trained in southern
India, hoped that this move would lead to a separate Tamil homeland of
Elam—but this was well beyond Indian intentions. The IPKF eventually
turned to fighting the Tigers—the very group they had come to save.
Approval of India's actions by the U.S. and USSR as well as
denying assistance to Sri Lanka while telling Colombo to look to its
neighbor for help, have been viewed by India as acceptance of India's
role in South Asia. While the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990 and its
deployment generally seen as a military failure for India, the problems
in Sri Lanka between the two ethnic factions continues unabated. Despite
a continued influx of refugees and claims of atrocities by the Sri Lankan
Army towards Tamils, the recent Indian Government has turned a blind eye
to the problems in Sri Lanka and recently dismissed the state government
in Tamilnadu for aiding and harboring known Tamil insurgents. These
factors may be cause for possible improvements in relations between the
two countries. New Delhi's main reason for strong-arming Colombo's
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acceptance of the Sri Lankan accord was to prevent and remove the
presence of foreign influences on the island. Having accomplished this
—
though Indian troops have withdrawn, India still claims that the accord
signed in July 1987 is valid—a repeated intervention is neither desired
nor expected.
Current problems between the two countries continue, while New
Delhi desires to develop a new treaty with the same limitations as the
1987 accord—which did not allow for foreign involvement in Sri Lankan
security—Sri Lanka is unwilling to have such limitations forced upon
her. Until a new treaty is signed, as far as India is concerned" ... the
1987 accord and its various accompaniments will continue to be in force."
[Ref 22: p. 71] Hopefully, as economic relations in South Asia improve,
the two countries can also dissolve the remainder of their bilateral
issues to a degree acceptable to both.
3. The Maldives
The Maldives is of interest to regional and external powers due
to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and the presence of an air
base at Gan built by the British during World War II. "Since 1976,
India, Pakistan, the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, China,
Japan, and several ASEAN and Nest Asian states have sought to assert
roles for themselves in the Maldives on a low-profile but nonetheless
competitive basis." [Ref 16: p. 61] The strategic importance of this
island nation to India is high, due specifically to its own island
territory of Minicoy only 90 miles north of the Maldives. Intrusion into
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the country from foreign powers or a hostile neighbor can be ill-afforded
by India. Relations between the two countries have always been on sound
footing and India has attempted to create various cultural and
educational links with the Maldives.
The Maldivian leaders have steered away from involving themselves
in the entanglements of security alliances and as a member of SAARC
maintain equitable relations with all nations inside and outside the
region. This is quite amicable to Indian desires as the Maldivian
leadership has limited its attempts to draw in outside powers for the
benefits of its economy. The nation has also been supportive of moves
for creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian ocean.
India's immediate response to requests for aid in preventing a
coup on November 3, 1988 has forged relations between the two nations. A
joint operation, under the code name Cactus, of India's military forces
quickly foiled an attempt by 150-200 Tamil mercenaries to overthrow the
government of the Maldives and brought much international and regional
praise for India's actions. This action has been viewed as a clear
example of "India's growing role as a great power in the South Asian
region." [Ref 23: p. 301
4. Bangladesh
India's intervention into East Pakistan in 1971 began its third
war with Pakistan and ended in the creation of an independent nation of
Bangladesh. India's part in the creation of Bangladesh ensured that
their relations began on the right foot. Yet the military's involvement
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in the politics in Bangladesh has led to its attempts to seek relations
with other powers including Pakistan and China. Though relations with
India have not led to armed conflict, differences between the two
countries include border problems, Bangladesh refugees in India, maritime
boundaries and water rights. Diplomatic efforts by both have insured
that the two will solve their problems peacefully.
India has remained aloof from internal developments in Bangladesh
and has been very supportive of recent democratic trends in this nation.
Though a founding member of SAARC and the idea of regional cooperation,
Bangladesh has sought military cooperation from abroad which may lead to
security implications in India. Recent involvement in the Gulf crisis by
Bangladesh could—but probably will not—increase military aid to this
tiny nation. Bangladesh's attempts to forge constructive ties outside of
the region will likely fail. The distance between it and Nest Asia is
great as is the disparity between its economy and those of the South East
Asian countries. Hence, like Pakistan, her roots and her future lie in
improving her relations in South Asia. Additionally, her creation
occurred at the same general time when India was being viewed by the
Superpowers as the regional power—thus giving Bangladesh no historical
linkage to outside powers.
It is of interest to note that the U.S. is providing a great deal
of humanitarian aid and assistance to Bangladesh following a devastating
natural disaster which has left millions homeless. India has voiced
concern of the presence of such a large number of U.S. ships so close to




Indo-Nepalese relations have been based on a relationship where
Nepal accepted Indian guidance on external relations and security issues
for almost complete internal autonomy. This was the same relationship
she had established with Great Britain during her rule of India. This
relationship was to be the basis of the treaty signed between the two in
July 1950, but the Chinese annexation of Tibet and internal political
problems in Nepal have forced a change. [Ref 13: p. 317]
Nepal has sought to develop relations with other
nations—specifically China—to counter its dependence upon India. The
Chinese have been supportive of Nepal's attempts by increasing trade and
arms aid to the tiny nation. Nepal's attempts to use the China card
against India has led to undermining the special relationship between the
two and heightened Indian fears of Chinese expansion of influence within
its security orbit. India has proposed a renewal of the special economic
relationship, which is a security interest for India and a national
interest for Nepal as the land locked nation requires transit rights
through India for its trade. Nepal has hesitated, but China's commitment
to her economic well being has been cautious and India's use of economic
coercion has caused significant problems for the country's economy.
[Ref 25]
Out of pure necessity in Nepal, Indo-Nepalese relations appear to
be improving. The two have signed important trade agreements which are
appeasing to both sides. The main factor forcing Nepal's hand is China's
fragile support, hence leaving it but one way to turn. India's near
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destruction of Nepal's economy over an exaggerated fear of Chinese
influence in that country was uncalled for. While this fear may have
been acceptable in the fifties and sixties, it is likely exaggerated in
the current decade. Future relations between these two nations must be
based on an acceptance by India of Nepal's peaceful intentions to develop
relations with countries outside of South Asia and a realization in Nepal
of legitimate Indian security concerns.
6. Bhutan
The last of the seven nations of South Asia is Bhutan.
Responding to the Chinese annexation of Tibet, Bhutan accepted an
accommodation with India, under the Treaty of 1949, making it part of
India's security system. The economic benefits to this tiny nation have
been tremendous as India has responded with very generous economic
assistance for development programs. There have been little to no
problems between the two countries as relations have been satisfactory to
both.
In summary, India's desire to become the security manager of
South Asia has not been explicitly accepted by all the nations in the
region. However, with this in mind, India has attempted to prevent
linkages between the nations of the region with powers outside of South
Asia—thus, de facto, allowing for the development of an Indian security
umbrella in South Asia.
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Future stability in South Asia "...will strongly depend on the
success of India, as the largest country in the region, in persuading its
smaller neighbors that it does not want to violate their national
sovereignty and that it is prepared to respect their independence and
territorial integrity." [Ref 26: p. 1162 3 While her actions have been
based upon a fear that outside involvement would impede upon her security
environment and curb Indian influence, it is time for India to improve
its bilateral relations with full regard to concerns in the smaller
states. The latest Indian governments have shown a tendency towards
developing closer regional ties
—
yet current political instability in
India has delayed the progress for now.
There is little doubt that India has used every means at its
disposal to prevent outside influence in South Asia. Nations attempting
to develop ties outside the region have had to face a barrage of
criticism from India which has only exacerbated bilateral and regional
issues. The examination of bilateral issues in South Asia in the
preceding chapter does not attempt to justify India's actions or blame
the smaller states for regional problems. There must be a clear
understanding that India as the major power in the region has a definite
responsibility to create an improved atmosphere for better relations
amongst all seven regional states—a policy which she has not always
followed in the past.
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B. MAJOR POBERS AND SOOTH ASIA
Involvement of the major powers—the Soviet Union, U.S., China, and
the Islamic Nations, specifically Saudi Arabia and Iran—in South Asia
have also been a factor in prohibiting Indian predominance in the region.
However, it can be said that in the long run India has been somewhat
successful in its dealing with these nations as at present their
influence in South Asia is declining—more as a result of international
events than India's influence—but declining just the same.
1. The Soviet Onion
Soviet-Indo relations had their beginnings in the 1950' s.
Various factors—including the Sino-Soviet split, U.S. -Pakistani
relations and India's influence in the third world via leadership of the
non-aligned movement (NAM)—have allowed for improved relations between
the two countries. As Sino-Soviet relations took a turn for the worse in
the 1950 's, the Soviets took advantage of deteriorating Sino-Indian
relations by improving its relations with New Delhi. India's position of
leadership in the NAM and a belief in Moscow that this could be an
advantage to Soviet influence in the third world, as well as, Indian
fears regarding a threat from the growing U.S. -Pakistan friendship gave
both a reason for improving ties.
The 1962 Sino-Indian war ended India's non-aligned status as she
immediately sought military aid from whomever would provide it. The
Soviets' delivery of its first shipment of MIG-21's in 1963 began the
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military relationship and her continued arms shipments during the 1965
Indo-Pakistani war—despite an embargo by the U.S. —was a critical point
in India's "tilt" towards Moscow. [Ref 27: p. 12-15)
Despite some difficulties in their relationship and the limited
influence which India actually had in Moscow, the Soviets have promoted
India's position in South Asia [Ref 281. The Soviets have been
supportive of India's regional role and thus unlike the other nations
being discussed have not been a real factor in suppressing India's
regional aspirations. Recent changes in the Soviet Union and major
economic problems have resulted in the Soviets need for hard currency.
This has undermined the special economic relationship between India and
the Soviets—for the Soviets cannot provide India with military equipment
on as favorable a basis as they have in the past—but both sides have
tried to assure each other of the desire to continue close ties. Given
the changes in the Soviet Union, its descendancy from superpower status
has left a void in India's security position which she will look to the
Nest to fill. As the Soviets are in no economic condition to support any
military efforts, she has softened her pro-Indian position on Kashmir,
for a more mid-line stance expressing the hope that neither country would
resort to war to solve their dispute. While this is not what India would
hope for—it is in line with the improving Soviet relations with China
and the U.S. and Moscow's unwillingness to create disharmony between
these two countries and itself. [Ref 291
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2. China
The Indo-Chinese relationship has for centuries been based on
peaceful coexistence. Nehru felt in 1947 that "Whatever changes might
take place in Asia, and the winds of change, as he described them, were
blowing over the whole continent, Sino-Indian friendship seemed one of
the stable factors." [Ref 30: p. 7] Though under a great deal of external
pressure—specifically from the U.S.—India supported communist China's
application to the United Nations in the early 1950 's and attempted to
mediate a resolution between Chinese and UN forces in Korea. India at
the time "opposed the United Nations resolutions branding China an
aggressor in the Korean war, criticized the United States' actions to
neutralize Taiwan in 1950 and attacked the Peace Treaty with Japan
because it had been registered by the United States without reference to
China." [Ref 31: p. 82-83] Despite differences raised over China's
annexation of Tibet, India went to great distances to maintain the
peaceful relations between the two countries.
China's annexation of Tibet also brought into play an agreement
between Great Britain and Tibet in 1914 which established the HcHahon
line. This line pushed India's border some 60 miles north—a position
which China did not accept. An uprising in Tibet in the late 1950's and
India's sanctuary to the Dalai Lama—Tibet's main religious leader—and
many Tibetians led to quickly deteriorating Sino-Indian ties. Both
nations increased military patrols in the region which led to repeated
skirmishes and eventually the 1962 conflict.
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The 1962 war between the two countries ended the historically
4known five principles of coexistence or Panch Sheela as they are called
in the Hindi Language. It has become apparent that these five principles
were more of a facade for Communist China's true intentions to seek
influence in South Asia. The humiliating Indian defeat at the hands of
the Chinese altered India's destiny as her policies of peaceful
coexistence turned into a need to build a military infrastructure of
combatting a two-faced threat from China and Pakistan.
While the Chinese have persisted in attempts to build anti-Indian
sentiment in the border nations between the two countries and in Sri
Lanka, their strongest relationship in South Asia is with Pakistan.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China's relationship with
Pakistan expanded as she perceived its security against a Soviet threat
was in turn crucial to preventing the Soviets from circling China. This
relationship has continued and China has been instrumental in Pakistan's
nuclear development and recently leased her a nuclear submarine in
response to the Soviet nuclear submarine leased to India.
As relations between these two Asian giants—India and
China—attempt to improve, the Chinese have since the mid 70 's lessened
the extent to which their policies encourage anti-Indian positions in the
4
The April 1954 Indo-Sino trade agreement was notable for first
enshrining the five principles of coexistence—Panch Sheela—respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression, non
interference in internal affairs, equality and mutuality, and peaceful
coexistence. For a text of this agreement see R. K. Jain ed.
,
China-South Asian Relations 1947-1980, Harvester Press, 1981 vol. 1,
pp. 61 -64.
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border countries and in India itself, and India has decreased its support
of Tibetan rebel groups and its demands for a reduction of Sino-Pakistani
ties. [Ref 13: p. 323] So while a cold war persists between the two
powers, attempts to develop confidence measures and decrease the border
tension between the two is ongoing. The likelihood of successful Chinese
intervention into South Asia is waning as is the influence it can project
into the Indian Ocean
—
yet India's military policies are more and more
based upon ensuring China continues to stay outside the Indian Ocean and
against the ever present fear of a Sino-Pakistani joint operation against
India "to teach her yet another lesson."
The changing Chinese view of India in the 70 's was in hopes of
countering Soviet influence in India. "Improving relations with New
Delhi was considered a better way to do this than a continuation of
confrontationist politics of 1960-1975." [Ref 13: p. 323] Indian fears are
growing as improvements in Sino-Soviet relations present the Chinese with
the chance to bring more of its forces to the Indian border. However,
any action by China against India will be closely watched by the U.S. and
India today is much more capable of handling a Chinese invasion than she
was in 1962. Both of these factors will act as a deterrent to Chinese
adventurism.
3. Middle East Countries
The nations of the Middle East—after the fall of the Shah of
Iran—have posed no serious potential military threat to India. However,
Pakistan's attempts to link herself with these countries after partition
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and even to join alliances with Iran, Turkey and Iraq, for some time, has
forced India to counter the threat of complete Islamic support of
Pakistan against India during a military conflict. India's positive
relations with other nations in the region helped minimize any material
assistance to Pakistan during conflicts in 1965 and 1971.
In its efforts to maintain these relations, India has supported
the causes of the Arabs and the Middle East nations, who have responded
by remaining non-partisan on issues between India and Pakistan. Thus
India has been relatively successful in countering Pakistan's attempts to
use Islam to create a bloc of support against India and should be able to
maintain this position despite recent events in the Gulf crisis and
India's positions on them.
4. The United States
India has always wanted to maintain strong diplomatic ties with
the United States. However, various factors have stood in the way of
these relations. Despite U.S. military aid during the 1962 conflict with
China and economic and food assistance at various times of need in India,
the United States' view of India's stand on non-alignment and her close
relations with the Soviet Union has caused both to see each other through
the cold war alignments.
The United States' commitment to Pakistan has specifically been a
barrier to Indo-U.S. relations. "Washington's decision in the mid 1950 's
to build up Pakistan militarily, ostensibly to contain the threat from
the Soviet Union to the free world, had a formative impact on India's
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view of the United States." tRef 3: p. 1101 U.S. military assistance to
Pakistan seriously undermined India's managerial role on the subcontinent
and, from an Indian perspective, created a major security threat for
India, clearly evidenced in 1965 when Pakistan effectively used its
American weaponry against India. [Ref 3:p.l08] The United States'
embargo of both of these countries during the 1965 war, though more of a
problem for Pakistan, left both nations with a feeling that the U.S.
could not be counted on for support and has thus since been labeled an
unreliable ally by both India and Pakistan.
A clear tilt towards Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war,
evidenced by deployment of the USS ENTERPRISE to the Indian Ocean and by
massive arms aid despite Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan, further
heightened Indian anxieties about the U.S. A secret trip to China by
Kissinger from Pakistan increased Indian fears about a
U.S. -Pakistan-Chinese axis and resulted in India's signing a Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971.
The United States' reduction of aid to Pakistan prior to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, over questions of nuclear proliferation,
was viewed positively by India. However, the massive buildup of
Pakistani forces with weapons more suitable to an attack on India vice
defense against the Soviets through Afghanistan combined with the
"decision to maintain a permanent naval presence through expansion of
Diego Garcia" [Ref 6: p. 381 after the Soviet's actions in Afghanistan were
factors inhibiting improved Indo-U.S. relations in the early 1980' s.
When relations with the Soviets seemed at their best, India made
significant attempts to diversify its arms imports by gaining access to
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Western—specifically U.S.—defense technology. "The poor performance of
Soviet hardware in the 1982 Syrian-Israeli air battle had caused deep
concern among Indian officials" [Ref 33: p. 50] Hence, obtaining advanced
systems from the U.S. made sense and could be viewed as an attempt by
India to denounce the critics who saw her as a Soviet client state,
especially after its official positions on the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The U.S. viewed India's desires to improve relations as an
opportunity to draw her away from the Soviet Union, or "at least as an
opening for India to follow a more balanced policy towards the rival
superpowers." [Ref 33: p. 501
The U.S. began to see India's emergence as a regional power with
a strong military arm capable of helping to maintain U.S. interests in
the Indian Ocean. "Thus in October, 1984 President Reagan signed a
secret directive instructing U.S. government agencies to seek improved
relations with India and accommodate Indian requests for dual-use
technology." [Ref 3: p. 1131 U.S. acquiescence to India's role in the
region was not given outright. However, Washington's public endorsement
of the India-Sri Lanka accord in July 1987, which demonstrated the
peacekeeping role India aspired to in South Asia, and was viewed in India
as "tacit acceptance of India's managerial role in all of South Asia
except Pakistan " [Ref 3: p. 1141
From an Indian perspective, good relations with the U.S. are a
must. The end of the cold war makes this relationship more valuable in
the context of declining U.S. -Pakistan ties and continuing
Islamabad-Beijing relations. The importance of this relationship to the
Indians is evidenced by the number of articles in Indian papers during
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the Gulf conflict denying any deterioration in ties as a result of
India's Gulf positions. As both nations can now view each other outside
of the cold war glasses the likelihood of sound relations—with ever
present bilateral issues of concern—is stronger than at anytime in the
past. A realization by the U.S. administration of internal Indian
political problems during the Gulf crisis, a factor influencing Indian
positions in the Gulf, is evidenced by very little U.S. concern over
India's Gulf statements and the suspension of U.S. refueling activities
5
by the U.S. to prevent further political chaos.
The recent deterioration of U.S. relations with Pakistan due to
renewed concern over Pakistan attempts to develop a nuclear weapon have
resulted in an increased tilt towards India by the U.S. This is further
enhanced by the declining strategic position that Pakistan has played
with waning American fears of communist expansion. This is evidenced by
a continued unwillingness to approve arms aid to Pakistan despite its
military role in the Gulf theatre. As this tilt towards India
continues—it is vital that both countries attempt to resolve issues
standing between them. This will certainly call for India learning to
live with a strong U.S. and its presence in the Indian Ocean. Continued
warming of Indo-U.S. ties is more dependent upon India than upon the U.S.
The U.S. no longer needs to accommodate India's every desire, in an
attempt to counter closer Indo-Soviet relations, for the realities of an
5
For more detailed discussion of India's evolving position on the
Gulf War, see below, chapter III, section C, p. 53.
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international system with essentially one superpower forces India to
place greater emphasis upon its ties with the U.S. than vice versa.
Strong U.S.-Indo ties should reduce the perception of a threat
from the U.S. in India and serve to enhance its position against a
possible Pakistan-Chinese axis. This should also decrease Indian
criticism of the U.S. Naval Forces—despite the Indian anxiety expressed
during recent U.S. aid to Bangladesh—in the region as they will, and
always have been, directed at security in the Persian Gulf, which is a
vital security interest to both nations. Additionally, U.S. discussions
with China over its military aid to Pakistan—especially assistance in
developing its nuclear potential—is of great interest to India, as is
the U.S.' s position that the Kashmir dispute be solved bilaterally in
conjunction with the 1972 Simla agreement.
C. INDIA'S SEEKING A GREATER REGIONAL ROLE
1 . The Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is the smallest of the three largest oceans of
the world. It has for centuries, served as the passageway of economic,
political and cultural interaction between the surrounding nations. The
shape of the ocean has been described as "H" shaped with the Indian
subcontinent forming the central "V" land mass, dividing the ocean into
separate quadrants of vital concern, As the British realized two
centuries ago, and the Indians realize now, the Indian subcontinent is
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the strategic center of the ocean, and any power based on the
subcontinent has an inherent interest in projection of power into all
areas of the ocean.
The importance of the region has grown with time. The need to
insure the safe passage of commerce by external nations through the
strategic ingress/egress points from the Pacific and Atlantic oceans has
impacted the region dramatically. The growing reliance upon natural
resources of the region by nations outside the ocean has increasingly
drawn foreign militaries into regional politics and is the basis of most
of the foreign policy activity in the region today.
The legacy of British beliefs of the Indian Ocean and their role
in it persists in India today. The rapid development of Indian naval
forces (see appendix) is evidence of a goal to project influence to all
corners of the Indian Ocean and beyond, as well as, the more important
need to minimize any possible threat from hostile neighbors from the sea.
However, the realities of a greater Indian Ocean role for India has been
hampered time and again by international events.
There are only two areas vital to Indian security that are
currently worth discussing, the Northeast and Northwest quadrants. While
the southern half of the ocean has two relatively important nations with
sizable naval forces—South Africa and Australia—neither poses a threat
to Indian national security nor to the disruption of lines of
communication in the region.
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2. The Northeast Quadrant
The Northeastern quadrant of the Indian Ocean is dominated by the
Indonesian Archipelago. This creates a natural barrier between the
nations of East Asia and the Indian Ocean. This region has a handful of
major passageways which are used by both naval and commercial shipping to
transit between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean and provide, for example,
vital shipping lanes for Japanese oil imports from the Middle East. The
security of these passageways is of utmost importance to all regional
players—China, India, Japan, USSR,—the local nations and the United
States
.
Future Chinese and Indian maritime competition will be centered
in this region as both nations attempt to project influence upon local
countries. U.S. presence in the Philippines and in Singapore will dampen
the actual effects of Sino-Indian competitive positions for now, but not
decrease efforts by both to apply influence in the region vis a vis each
other. Indian fears of Chinese adventurism in the region are exacerbated
by the locality of Indian claims only a short distance from the area.
The presence of Indian naval base on Great Nicobar island only 80 miles
from Sumatra, have enhanced Chinese anxiety over Indian attempts to
impinge upon areas in the South China Sea. The local countries continue
to counter influence from both countries by enhancing their own naval
development programs which has led to increased naval cooperation among
the ASEAN countries and cooperation with Australia and New Zealand. [Ref
34: p. 11] These efforts are vital to security of all of these countries
as none has the ability to protect itself alone.
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3. The Norhtwest Quadrant
The Northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean contains the Red Sea,
the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The navies of the countries in
this region are fairly modest with only the Saudi' s and Iran having
committed much effort at building small naval forces. India's interest
in this area are the same as most other nations of the world—the access
to stable flow and stable priced oil. Additionally, at risk for India
are the 1.2 million Indians currently working and living in the Gulf
region who supply India with much needed remittances. The United States'
concerns over this necessity has resulted in attempts to access basing
right in the region and a continued major U.S. Naval presence since the
British withdrawal from the area in the 1970' s. This concern has also
led to continued U.S. support of Pakistan in U.S. endeavors to prevent
Soviet influence in the Gulf.
India surely saw the chance to increase her security role in the
Gulf by taking advantage of the end of the cold war to assume a
leadership position in the Indian Ocean. However, any Indian hopes for
an Indian Ocean security system including the Gulf countries and
excluding the superpower navies has been nullified, for the time being,
by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. will likely continue its naval
deployments throughout the 1990 's and and beyond and be hesitant to rely
fully upon any local nations to protect U.S. interests in the
region—thus a exclusive naval role for India in the Gulf region is
definitely on hold. However, as U.S.-Indo relations improve and U.S.
budgetary constraints take effect there may be an increasing gap for
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India to fill with regards to security of the lines of communications in
the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.
While the recent events in the Gulf have increased the U.S. naval
presence in the Gulf and may be cause for a permanent regional presence,
cuts in U.S. military expenditures may eventually force the U.S. to
reduce these deployments. Though this is not foreseen in the near
future, the creation of a security system in the Gulf region and a return
of Arab calls for limiting U.S. presence may allow for greater Indian
participation in protection of these vital shipping lanes.
It has become increasingly obvious to the Indians that they are
prevented from wielding influence upon the nations of the Indian Ocean,
as the British had done, simply by virtue of their military capability.
This is clearly evidenced by the fact that these nations look to the U.S.
or the Soviets for assistance in times of conflict and even more so by
the realization that India is more economically dependent upon these
countries than they are dependent upon India's leadership role in the
third world. The world of the 20th century is much different than the
world of the 18th and 19th centuries and India must adapt to the current
situation and let go of the past.
While the South Asian region has been largely ignored by the
Superpowers and will continue to be—with the exception of preventing
nuclear proliferation—the other areas of the Indian Ocean are not.
Indian influence in South Asia is not of concern to nations outside the
region—however, attempts to project power into the other quadrants of
the ocean are and will continue to be prevented by forces beyond India's
control.
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III. INDIA AND THE PERSIAN GOLF CRISIS
A. INDIA'S INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Before discussing India's actions during the Gulf crisis, it is
important to understand her foreign policy concerns in the Middle East.
As previously indicated, India has attempted to maintain positive
relations with the Middle East nations to counter any gains that Pakistan
might achieve from its relations with these countries, based on its
Islamic foundation. India has been supportive of Arab causes in the
United Nations, for example, the right of the Palestinians to their own
state, and for many years supportive of the Arab countries in their
endeavors to resist Israel. "India is, so to speak, surrounded by
Islamic countries... and was keen to prove to the world that India is a
"secular" state and, therefore, does not take sides against the
coreligionaries of Pakistan." IRef 35: p. 92-931
More specifically, India has sought support of her claim to
Kashmir—the largest bone of contention between India and Pakistan—from
the Middle Eastern regimes. Pakistan's participation in U.S. sponsored
alliances in the mid—1950 's with Middle East countries Iran, Turkey and
Iraq (until 1978) was viewed as a major threat to India.
To counter this perceived threat, India sought to construct a
close relationship with several other Islamic states in the region,
primarily Egypt and Syria... New Delhi's objective was to prevent the
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emergence of a unified Islamic bloc supportive of Pakistan in its
recurrent disputes with India, and the Indians were reasonably
successful in this endeavor. During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965
and 1971 , most of the Islamic states adopted positions publicly
sympathetic to Pakistan, but only Pakistan's two allies, Iran and
Turkey, actually provided small amounts of material assistance. [Ref
13:p.325J
Following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan—having been
strategically reduced by the separation from its eastern half—sought to
further increase its relations with its western neighbors. Iran's
massive improvements in arms was good reason for Pakistan to attempt to
create better relations, as was the oil price increases in the early
70's.
It was, however, resented in Islamabad that Tehran was improving its
relations with India and actually equating both countries. "In the
1974-8 period, for instance, Iran under the Shah sought to maintain a
security relationship with Pakistan directed at the Soviet Union while,
in effect, opting out of its earlier position of support for Pakistan in
its disputes with India." [Ref 13: p. 3261
While the overthrow of the Shah and resulting collapse of CENTO
nullified the threat perceived in India of Pakistan's alliance with the
Middle East nations, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan re-created the
threat. A massive boost in U.S. aid to Pakistan preceded an increased
role for Pakistan in Gulf security.
In the invasion aftermath, relations between Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan improved as diplomatic visits took place at a high level and
in rapid succession. Indeed, Afghanistan may have been the clinching
argument for Pakistan to send troops to Saudi Arabia; in February
1980, Pakistan '8 president Zia Ul-Haq encouraged Washington to forge
improved Saudi-Pakistani military cooperation, leading the Saudi' s to
agree to an exchange of arms for Pakistani security assistance. [Ref
15:p.69)
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While India was not supportive of the Soviet action in Afghanistan,
she refrained from official condemnation of the act for fear of upsetting
her primary source of weaponry, particularly in the face of an increasing
threat from Pakistan and the developing Sino-Pakistan military alliance.
India's failure to condemn the invasion isolated it from all Gulf
countries except Iraq. Although India did score some foreign policy
gains in the Gulf by 1981, Pakistan remained the hardest barrier
between India and the Gulf States; indeed, India's rejection in 1981
of Pakistan's proposal for a no-war pact injured India's image in the
Gulf.
In the view of one observer, this pushed India to improve its
relations with Pakistan as a means of bettering its relations with
the Gulf States. By intensifying Pakistan's traditional links with
the Gulf States, the Afghanistan intervention made it even more
difficult for India to increase its influence in the Gulf without
first taking some steps to bridge its differences with Pakistan. [Ref
15:p.761
More recently, Indian relations with the Middle East countries have
improved. This is evidenced by a recent trip by Gujral, prior to the
invasion, to the Arab world where "all Arab states with the exception of
Saudi Arabia, and Iran backed India's stand calling for a resolution of
the Kashmir dispute within the framework of the Simla accord" [Ref
36: p. 35-36] This accord calls for a bilateral solution to the problem
vice an international one which Pakistan has long wanted. "The isolation
of Pakistan in the Arab world on an issue with strong Islamic undertones
would be a concrete result..." [Ref 36: p. 361 for India.
Of vital economic concern to India, as with all oil importing
nations, has been a continuous and stable priced supply of oil from the
region. The oil price hike in 1973 witnessed improved economic relations




played a big role in increasing of oil prices and came to India's
assistance to "...alleviate India's predicament following the increase in
the price of oil." [Ref 35: p. 921 "A number of agreements on economic
cooperation were signed during 1974 and 1975, providing for expansion of
crude oil supply to India over the next five years and, extensive Iranian
credit facilities to cover imports from that state." [Ref 37: p. 321 In
addition, Iraqi, assistance with a loan of $110 million for crude imports
during the same time period helped India meet the increased demands. "A
number of other agreements were also signed. . .including ones to supply 30
million tons of crude oil to India to the proposed refinery at Mathura,
and exchange of consultancy services between Engineers India Limited and
the Iraqi petroleum industry." [Ref 37: p. 33] Though seriously affected
by the four-fold increase in oil prices, New Delhi supported the increase
"as this was quite consistent with the general tenor of India's policy
which has supported the rights of states to exercise full sovereign
control over their natural resources." [Ref 37: p. 321 India's backing of
"... the action taken by OPEC at the CIES conference at Paris was
appreciated, and created a favorable condition for bilateral negotiation
with friendly oil-producing countries, for an assured supply of crude and
long-term credits." [Ref 37: p. 32] Prior to the invasion, India imported
some 4054-50% of its annual requirement—half of that from Iraq and
Kuwait.
In addition to oil for its economy, the Middle East has been an
important outlet for bilateral trade for Indian consumer goods and
accounts for about 7 percent of India's total foreign trade. These
countries "...also provide an outlet for the export of Indian engineering
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products, technical know-how (Iraq and Libya in particular) and
manpower." [Ref 37: p. 33] As an example, over 50 percent of Indian
construction projects in foreign countries take place in Iraq.
The 1.2 million Indians in the Gulf provide billions of dollars
annually in remittances to India. These individuals are of utmost
importance to the Indian Government as implied from India's deployment of
the INS GODAVARI in 1986 off the coast of South Yemen in response to an
attempted coup and escalation of violence resulting in the deaths of
thousands of people. "The government's intention was to try to assist
some 5000 Indian nationals working in South Yemen. . .and. . .reflected
India's desire to show that it has a legitimate interest in events taking
place in Western Asia and Arabia." [Ref 5: p. 15] The majority of the
Indians in the Gulf countries are laborers, but there are also many
professionals and businessmen. The Indians have not only vastly
contributed to the economic development of the host nationals but also
helped in building cultural and sports ties contributing to the
strengthening of links between India and the Middle East. There were
approximately 200,000 Indians in Iraq and Kuwait—mostly in Kuwait—at
the time of the invasion.
On a much broader level, stability in the Middle East is a vital
security interest to India. Islamic-inspired problems in the Gulf region
can easily spill over into the sub-continent. For example, the Afghan
conflict has had an important effect on the fighting in Kashmir. Some
Kashmir militants reportedly began fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980 's
and have since played an important role in the latest uprisings in
Kashmir. The fear of exacerbating already tense Hindu-Muslim relations
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or creation of an Islamic upheaval in India are further reasons to fear
continued Islamic unrest in the Middle East.
Escalating tensions in the Gulf region have always preceded the build
up of foreign forces in the region. India's long standing desire to rid
the Indian ocean and Persian Gulf of foreign power naval forces—in order
to increase her own influence—has not come to fruition due to a Western
need to prevent Soviet influence in the Gulf region. However, more
recently the interest has been more to prevent any disruption of vital
oil lanes by regional adversaries. India's role in protection of these
vital shipping lanes has been suppressed by an unwillingness to
participate in an alliance in support of Western needs [Ref 381.
Additionally, she has lacked the support of the U.S. and Gulf countries.
India's more recently acquired naval strength and the ending of the
cold war should provide a better opportunity and less reluctance to
partake in a security role in the Gulf since this role would not be based
upon protection of Western interests vs. the Eastern Bloc countries.
While India's positions on the Gulf crisis has left India isolated in the
region, eventual acquiescence from Gulf nations with much weaker naval
forces and a U.S. forced to reduce its peacetime deployments due to
fiscal constraints make this position a serious possibility. However, it
is a vital necessity that India strengthen her foundations in South Asia
before attempting to broaden her role into the Gulf region. Western and
Middle Eastern doubts about India's ability to effectively secure
shipping lanes in the Gulf will increase if she must continuously focus
on regional and domestic issues.
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As part of its security interest, India has blamed the arras race in
the Indian Ocean on the influx of U.S. weapons into the region. While
attempting to maintain weapons superiority over Pakistan and balance the
Chinese threat, India has been persistent in trying to block weapons
sales and foreign influence to regional countries—especially Pakistan.
However, India's ability to prevent sales to Middle Eastern countries is
both limited and would contradict her attempts to improve ties in the
region.
India's Post-Gulf-War attempts to impress upon the U.S. the need to
limit access to weapons by newly formed U.S. allies is in vain. While
perception of an actual military threat from the Gulf region is currently
limited, a massive influx of sophisticated hardware which could make its
way into Pakistan—especially in view of India's current image in the
region—could have long term implications for India. Additionally, the
emergence of longer range missiles into the Gulf region make it a
necessity for India to carefully examine her own capabilities,
underscored by a realization of a desire to increase her position in
South Asia and the effect which new weapons systems can have on her South
Asian neighbors.
India's actions and position toward events in the Gulf during the
crisis only partially reflected the concerns outlined above. Though
India '8 stance on the crisis gradually shifted from an equivocal
statement to strong condemnation, she has been criticized internally and
internationally for the weakness of her initial position. The following
section of the thesis will examine India's actions and stance on the
crisis and how her stance changed as the crisis unfolded.
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While explanations as to why the Indian Government chose the path
that it did will be discussed in the next chapter, essential to
understanding her positions and her actions during the crisis is the
realization that she was being led by an unstable minority Government
coalition, whose every action could create reason for one or all members
of the coalition to withdraw their support. In addition the presence of
a large, though minority, Muslim population in India, for years in the
midst of communal violence, forced the government to be careful in its
approach to the developing crisis in the Gulf, for fear of fueling an
already tense situation.
B. INDIA'S ACTIONS IN THE GOLF
As the Gulf crisis began to unfold, New Delhi's policy for dealing
with it developed into a 3 point plan of action. "One, to explore ways
to de-escalate the situation, created by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and
subsequent events, two, to ensure the safety of Indians in Kuwait and
Iraq and, three, to find ways out of the difficulties, to be created by
international sanctions against Iraq." [Ref 391 The understanding of the
severity of the situation to India is evidenced by the immediate trips
abroad by the Indian foreign minister Inder Kumar Gujral and Indian
efforts to "...explore the possibility of convening a U.N. security
council meeting to find solutions to ease...." the economic burden on
countries as a result of the sanctions on Iraq. [Ref 391
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India did very little with regard to the first element of her plan.
Though Indian papers lauded India's NAM initiatives and the Foreign
Minister I.K. Gujral's visits abroad to find a solution to the crisis,
little was reported in the international press and her efforts were,
needless to say, unproductive. While the Foreign Minister's trip to the
USSR resulted in a joint communique declaring the need to defuse the
crisis peacefully and fearing the build up of foreign forces in the
region—it did nothing to help resolve the crisis. Discussions with US
officials regarding Indian efforts to mediate in the crisis is doubtful
as Gujral stated on 16 August in Washington that "...the focus of the
discussion he had with Mr. Baker was on the problems faced by the large
number of Indian Nationals working in...." the Gulf and explaining " to
the U.S. Secretary of State the economic problems faced by India
following the Gulf crisis." [Ref 40]
Before returning to India, Gujral went to Baghdad to discuss "every
aspect of the problems of the Indians in Iraq and Kuwait . " with Iraq
officials. [Ref 411 Briefing parliament upon his return to India, he
told a packed parliament that "India has ruled out any mediatory or good
offices role for herself in the Crisis and the primary reason for his
tour was to ensure the welfare, security and well being of the large
Indian Community in the Gulf." [Ref 42] Additionally, he told both
houses that the U.S. would not stand in the way of efforts to dispatch
humanitarian supplies to Indian and other third world nationals in the
region and "He expressed fears that countries like, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, who have decided to send troops to the area, may use it as an
excuse for further militarizing themselves. [Ref 42]
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Gujral's rush trip to the USSR implies an unwillingness by India to
accept the Soviets fall from superpower status. The joint communique
resulting from that trip implies an obvious fear by both nations of the
presence of massive U.S. forces so near to their respective borders. In
addition, India surely realized its position was being viewed as pro
Iraqi and attempted to give it credibility by turning to her long time
friends in Russia to ensure that they, at least, would not turn against
her. Gujral's visits to the US and Iraq were taken on the premise to
ensure the safety and security of the Indians in Kuwait and to ensure the
world understood how India would be economically affected by the embargo
and the rise in oil prices.
India pushed a peace proposal through the NAM in the later stages of
the crisis but to little avail. In reality one must question the ability
of the NAM to do anything to help resolve this issue. Both Iraq and
Kuwait are members of the NAM and other member countries like Egypt and
Algeria were so divided on the issue to give a NAM proposal any
credibility. Additionally, the current chairman Yugoslavia was
demonstrating a high degree of ambivalence as it faced its own internal
problems. [Ref 431 Furthermore, the crisis had the full attention of the
United Nations—a world body having no success in defusing the situation.
The time for NAM to act was prior to the invasion—after which it was
fruitless—as the crisis turned into an international problem vice merely
a regional one. India's desire to use NAM to help resolve the crisis was
based on her historical leadership role in that organization. However,
India's image in NAM was severely damaged after its position on the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and recent decline of U.S. -Soviet
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relations has had many NAM members questioning the organizations utility.
[Ref 441
India's action to ensure the safety of her countrymen in the Gulf
were unparalleled. The Indian Government—under a great deal of pressure
from parliamentary groups and other state governments—focused its
attention on taking care of its citizens. She embarked upon a
two-pronged approach—the first to establish a plan to help repatriate as
many citizens as possible, and the second, to gain permission from the UN
to send food and medicine to help alleviate the sufferings caused by
shortages and Iraqi refusal to provide for the many Indians and other
Third World Nationals in the region.
India was very successful in repatriating its citizens from Iraq and
Kuwait. She was able to obtain permission to conduct air, sea, and land
operations to evacuate Indians from the Gulf. She proceeded to evacuate
some 150,000 to 170,000 Indians—almost all of those desiring to leave
the region. According to Indian diplomats in late November 1990 in
Baghdad "only 20,000 Indians remained in Kuwait, with 5,000 still in
Iraq." [Ref 451 The Indians had conducted one of the greatest airlifts
since the Berlin blockade and undoubtedly did more for it's citizens in
the Gulf than any other nations with masses of people in the region.
[Ref 46]
Indian efforts to send food and medicine to the Gulf were also a
success. Direct requests were made to the U.N. security council members
after Iraq stated early September, it would no longer provide food to the
East Asians in the region. [Ref 47] After days of deliberation, the
Security Council agreed to the Indian request as long as items "...be
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provided through the United Nations in cooperation with International
Committee of Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies."
[Ref 48]
Iraq tried very hard to make the Indian effort look like a breach of
the UN sanctions by claiming it would only allow the Indian ship into
Kuwait on a bilateral basis and if food distribution was handled by
Indian authorities. [Ref 49] India successfully sidestepped this attempt
by ensuring the presence of Indian Red Cross officials aboard the ship,
carrying 10,000 tons of food and medicine, which docked in Kuwait in late
September. Having off-loaded half its cargo, Iraq tried again to
sabotage India's action by refusing to allow the ship to depart without
turning over the remainder of its cargo to Iraqi authorities. India's
outright refusal, until authorization was given by the UN, demonstrated
India's support of the UN sanctions against Iraq.
India's attempts to ensure the safety and security of its citizens
can be linked to her soft initial position against Iraq—though publicly
denied by Indian officials—which cost her heavily in the international
arena. However, regardless of the cost, her actions in this regard were
quite exemplary. It is interesting to note that the concern for Indians
in the Gulf was evident throughout the nation. Strong cries for the
Government to take immediate and overt action to aid its citizens in the
Gulf emanated from all sectors of Indian society. Some parliamentary
groups observed a day long fast in mid-August to demonstrate their
anxiety over the cause of the Indians in the Gulf—most notably was the
opposition members of the Congress Party—likely more of a political
maneuver by Rajiv Gandhi than a sign of real concern. [Ref 501
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The third area of Indian actions was to attempt to correct Indian
economic problems caused by the invasion and subsequent embargo. The
stoppage of oil exports from Iraq and Kuwait—which were contracted to
supply 2.25 and 1.5 million tons respectively, as well as 4.5 million
tons of Iraqi crude diverted to India from the Soviets, of India's 18.5
million ton requirement for the fiscal year—forced her to seek other
sources of crude. At the beginning of the crisis, India had received
less than half of the oil contracted from Kuwait and Iraq. By the end of
August she had signed term contracts with other oil producing nations
—
including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia and Bahrain—to offset the
distribution of supplies from Iraq and Kuwait. Crude started arriving
with only a two week gap in shipments. [Ref 511
Another oil related problem, though not linked to the Gulf Crisis,
was a disruption of the flow of crude from the oil fields in upper Assam.
Students demanding implementation of the Assam accord and cancellation of
the construction of a loop crude oil pipeline caused the disruption of
crude to some of the Indian refineries. [Ref 521
While the oil exporting countries of the world were relishing in
rising oil prices and were quick to come to India's aid in supplying oil
to meet her shortages—the higher prices of oil on the world market
created havoc with India's already fragile foreign exchange situation.
India, like many other countries, was forced to cut back on other imports
and apply measures to reduce consumption. For example, the government
banned the use of official vehicles once a week and put a tax on all oil
products except for kerosene. The increased cost placed an estimated
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additional two billion dollar burden on foreign exchange holdings for
1990 compared to 1989. [Ref 53]
The Indian economy was also hampered by the forced reduction in
exports to the Gulf. Indian exports to Iraq and Kuwait amounted to some
$300 million annually and Iraq owes India $800 million for completed
construction projects which had a potential for higher future revenue.
In addition, remittances of between 500 and 600 million dollars from
Indians in Iraq and Kuwait completely stopped and frightened Indian
citizens throughout the entire region were quitting their jobs and
returning home. To make matters worse, the Indian government spared no
expense in airlifting Indian citizens out of the region eventually
running up a massive bill. All in all, the total effects upon the Indian
economy were estimated at four billion dollars, an expense the economy
with a massive foreign debt load and sizeable internal budget deficit
could hardly afford. [Ref 53]
In an effort to help alleviate the financial crunch, India sought and
obtained an IMF loan of $1.8 billion. While it appears that there were
no strings attached to this loan it is possible that the speed with which
it was granted could be linked to overflight and refueling rights allowed
to U.S. transport aircraft on the basis of bilateral U.S.-Indo relations.
Though there is no documented proof of this linkage the fact that India
had granted refueling rights to the U.S. and given the U.S.'s voting
power in the IMF make this a feasible suggestion.
India's accession to a non permanent seat on the 12 member security
council in January 1991 gave a perfect opportunity for the country to
play a role in security council decisions, yet no vote was forthcoming
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until after the war was completed. In the interim, India pushed for a
cessation of hostilities—realistically more of an attempt by the new
government to bring India back to the surface in the international arena
than any expectation of success. This is evidenced by answers of the
Indian Ambassador to the U.N., C. R. Gharekhan, to questions asked by Pat
Buchanan and Mike Kinsley on CNN's Crossfire on 26 February 1991.
Portions of the discussions are shown below:
Kinsley : . . .In the opinion of the United Nations Security Council,
how does Saddam Hussein end the war against him.
Amb . Gharekhan : The efforts of some countries, Soviet Union,
India and a few others, over the last 48 hours have been to secure
total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
accordance with Security Council resolution 660—at the same time to
prevent as much as possible loss of life, loss of property on all
sides, not just Iraqi but Iraqi, Kuwait, American, and others.
Buchanan : This is not January 15th, it is now February 25 or
26th I believe. India and the Soviet Union do not have troops in
battle. The Americans do, the French do, the British do, the
Egyptians do. Since you're not bearing the burden of battle, why
should the United States and its coalition partners, now that the war
has begun listen to what New Delhi has to say rather than what they
want to achieve?... What is wrong with the people who are fighting
the battle deciding how it should end?
Amb. Gharkhan : I think Hashington should listen to New Delhi and
Moscow and several other capitals for the simple reason that we are
in the Security Council. It is the Security Council which has
authorized the use of force and therefore the Security Council has
every Locus Tendi in this matter.
Buchanan : Mr. Ambassador, the United States, Britain, and
France, I believe, all have veto power in the Security Council. They
can block any kind of resolution which suggests that they ought not
to do something they want to do. As a practical matter, isn't the
authority you're trying to express here simply not much more than the
opinion and perhaps the moral authority of the Indian government?
Amb. Gharekhan : Well, it is true that we don't have veto power
and the veto powers can block anything which they don't like. This
is a fact of life. Ne have to live with it but that does not mean
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that countries like mine which are members of the Security Council,
we have been elected by the General Assembly of the United nations.
We have a moral obligation to ourselves and to the international
community. [Ref 54: p. 5-6]
The ambassador's comments clearly indicate a realization by India of
its limited ability to force a cessation of hostilities and thus implies
an attempt to improve its image amongst the international community.
C. INDIA'S STAND ON THE CRISIS
While India's actions in the gulf crisis were of limited concern to
the international effort against Iraq—with the exception of her desire
to send humanitarian supplies to the region—her stance on the crisis
caused an uproar throughout the world. There is one specific factor or
event which can be viewed as a turning point in India's position on the
crisis—a point in time in mid-October when the majority of the Indian's
in the crisis zone had been evacuated. After this time India's stand on
Iraqi's invasion went from an equivocal position to clear condemnation of
Iraqi action. This section will examine India's stance on the crisis and
how it changed at the period indicated.
India's initial position on the Iraqi invasion was that "she is
opposed to the use of force in any form between the two countries. India
hoped that Iraq would soon withdraw its troops from Kuwait." [Ref 55]
This position was indicative of India's belief that her close ties with
both Iraq and Kuwait—much closer with Iraq—required her to be measured
in her public statements and that the "... conflict was complex and India
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should act tactfully." [Ref 56] The complexities for India in this
crisis were many—the safety of her citizens, her long standing
friendship with Iraq to name only a few—and at the same time, India was
caught between appeasing the international community and preventing the
alienation of the only country in the region who had consistently stood
by her on the Kashmir issue. Thus she took a position that did not
clearly place her on either side of the conflict.
Building on her initial stance, VP Singh stated on 17 August that
India's position on Gulf event has three basic elements—"opposition to
the use of force in relations between states, support to the UN response
and disapproval of unilateral action, not mandated by the world body."
[Ref 561 India stood by its initial position, even in the face of heavy
criticism from Western and Arab countries, claiming that New Delhi was
following a policy that conformed to its national interest and that
"...it had expressed firm views on the annexation of Kuwait, and had
given unswerving, unequivocal support to all five security council
resolutions in the wake of recent developments in the Gulf." [Ref 57]
Indian officials used this particular quote as a crutch to support
India's position against Iraq's invasion. However, support of the UN
resolutions did not condemn Iraq's actions—it only agreed to support
resolutions which India knew would not have been in her best interests to
attempt to defy.
India's position that it was opposed to the use of force among
nations is at best an attempt to justify her inactive role in the crisis.
Since few nations in the world support military conflict over diplomacy,
it is questionable if this position is even worth examination. Yet if
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viewed from the fact that India has participated in various conflicts
over the past 40 years it is hypocritical. However, more careful
examination shows an India willing to act militarily only in the context
of South Asia and in view of what New Delhi saw as an attempt to subvert
its influence in that region. India's strong positions against the U.S.
in Korea, Vietnam, and Libya as well as condemnation of Israeli actions
in 1973, are examples of her positions on conflicts outside the region.
Additionally, despite India's unwillingness to publicly condemn the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is no secret that privately Indira
Gandhi strongly expressed her distaste of Moscow's actions. This issue
must also be examined from India's strong relations with the Soviets—as
she had with Iraq—and the Soviets aid to her military development.
Hence, this position on the Gulf crisis should have been expected.
In the same vein, Mr. I. K. Gujral's statement that "India was not
sending troops to the area because it was part of its foreign policy not
to commit troops outside" [Ref 39] is also an attempt to justify her
inaction and to possibly link it with some other nations who did not
respond militarily due to constitutional constraints. This position must
also be viewed from a South Asian perspective. Additionally, this policy
needs to be examined in light of India's recent withdrawal from Sri Lanka
as well as a possible changing foreign policy towards events outside of
South Asia, both of these issues will be discussed in the final chapter.
India's insistence that a peaceful solution was the only way to
resolve the crisis is directly linked to the realization that her economy
was being stifled by events in the Gulf. If peacefully resolved, her
people would be able to remain in the Gulf and remittances would begin to
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flow—it was not an admission that she was against the use of force—only
that it be under the auspices of the U.N. This was also an indication of
how disturbing India found the sudden massive buildup of U.S. led forces
in the region—especially at a time when Moscow was showing less personal
interest in being involved. This fear must be viewed in the light of the
United States' world policeman role—a role that India would not be apt
to accept as it sees itself in that position in the Indian Ocean.
As the numbers of Indians in the Gulf area decreased and reality of
Iraq's two faced approach to the assurances given to India regarding
Indian citizens in the region, [Ref 581 India "...made what is by far the
most clear and apparently final position on the Gulf crisis." [Ref 59]
Mr. Gujral's trip to the UAE—the Gulf country with closest ties to
India—was picked as the place to clarify the concerns of many Gulf
nations of India's perceived position on the crisis. In a prepared
statement, he said:
He believe that states have the right to take steps that are
necessary, in order to defend themselves... India supported the early
convening of an international conference (for Nest Asia) to resolve
other outstanding issues. . .While we recognize the complexities of the
situation, we hope that there will be a peaceful solution in the
interest of all. [Ref 59]
The implications of this statement were a far flung change in India's
foreign policy towards the crisis. The "steps necessary" are obviously
militaristic and are an acceptance of the US-led presence in the
region—one which India has never supported in the past. The second
portion is a clear unwillingness to link the Iraqi pullout with the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, though still expressing support for
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The creation of Palestine. "Recognizing complexities" is a realization
that it may not be possible to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and
force would be supported if necessary. [Ref 59]
The Indian foreign policy was finally beginning to take shape.
Officially, India "...rejected any insinuation of opportunism or
expediency linking earlier positions to the fact that Indian Nationals
were stranded in Iraq and Kuwait." [Ref 591 However, as stated by one
Indian Diplomat,
No government in a democracy, especially one in a see-saw at home can
afford to ignore this aspect. I don't know if we want to say more
than what has been said but we cannot risk (the Iraqi President) Mr
Saddam Hussein's unpredictability. Look at what is happening to some
others. [Ref 44]
This last comment is in reference to reports of Iraqi actions toward
citizens of other Asian countries who were posed against Iraq in support
of the coalition. Though India had been assured of special treatment of
her citizens by Iraqi officials, later reports clearly indicated that
this hope was seriously misguided. However, regardless of India's
unwillingness to officially accept this claim, the fact remains that
India's stronger positions came to surface only after the number of
Indians was drastically reduced and though this was not the sole reason
for India '8 initial stand, it likely weighed most heavily upon the minds
of India's political elite.
The changing Indian position on the Gulf crisis was more in line with
the majority of the international community. However, the Government's
problems on the home front were escalating beyond control and within
57
three weeks of India's bolder stance, the VP Singh government was
dissolved and Chandra Shekhar was inducted as India's next Prime Minister
on 10 November 1990.
It is interesting to note that in the past after taking office, all
Indian Prime Ministers have initially focussed their attentions on
foreign affairs—whether as a need to project their international
influence and prestige or a real necessity due to circumstances in the
world. Chandra Shekhar, for both of these reasons, turned his initial
attentions to India's foreign policy.
The realization that attempting to solve India's internal problems
was both nearly impossible and could easily result in his demise, forced
him to try and bring India back into the forefront in the international
arena in order to improve his chances of maintaining his hold on the
Prime Ministership. Additionally, Congress leader, Rajiv Gandhi had
heavily criticized VP Singh for allowing India to "...become a nonentity
in international affairs." [Ref 601 The fact that Shekhar 's position was
based on support from the Congress Party was further justification for
attempting to tackle foreign policy issues. His trip and statements at
the SAARC conference in November 1991—a trip which many in India
expected would be cancelled due to internal problems—was considered a
big success with regards to improving India's relations with her South
Asian neighbors, and in the push for making SAARC a stronger
organization.
On the Gulf, the new prime minister continued with the latest
policies established by the preceding government. He stated that Mr.
Saddam Hussein "...should have responded more favorably to the U.S. offer
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of negotiating after the U.N. Security Council set a deadline for Iraq to
vacate Kuwait, failing which all measures, including war, would be
legitimate against Iraq." [Ref 61] This was by far the strongest and the
"...first outright criticism of Iraq by India." [Ref 611 The new Prime
Minister also concurred with the refusal to "linkage", while at the same
time still supporting an eventual solution to the Palestinian problem.
India's permission for U.S. aircraft to be refuelled at Bombay's
International Airport can be seen as test of both India's relations with
the U.S. and its new policy on the Gulf crisis. Shekhar's refusal to end
the refueling and risk losing the support of the Congress Party are
evidence of his resolve to see the Iraqi's ousted from Kuwait. In
addition, Shekhar was trying to assure the world that he was not a puppet
of the Congress Party and while he only had full support of 54 members of
parliament, he fully intended to take action independently of the
Congress Party's wishes. He was pressured by Congress leader, Rajiv
Gandhi, to end the refueling as Gandhi saw it against India's
non-alignment policy. However, this was seen in India as a clear attempt
by Gandhi to prevent Shekhar from gaining too much respect and popular
support for his success in India's foreign arena.
Despite heavy criticism, Shekhar did not officially withdraw the
refueling rights granted to the U.S. "The USA has decided to make
alternate arrangements for transit halt and refueling of its transport
aircraft flying to and from the Gulf" [Ref 621 effective 20 February
1991. As stated by Mr. William Clark, U.S. Ambassador to India,
Washington appreciated India's Gulf position and " had no desire to
cause any domestic friction over the issue of refueling facilities for
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its aircraft." [Ref 62] At a time when Indo-U.S. relations are on an
upswing, this act demonstrates the strength of these relations and a
realization by the U.S. administration of the complexities of current
Indian political situation.
It is unfair to only assess India on the basis of her stand after the
change over in government. This period in Indian foreign policy was
wrought with strong undertones of policy formulation based purely on
political aspirations and moves by opposing parties. This is clearly
evidenced by Shekhar's attempted unwillingness to bend to Congress'
wishes and specifically his sudden unexpected resignation though Congress
had not pulled support for his party. Additionally, certain initiatives
undertaken by Congress party members at Rajiv's request were an attempt
to demonstrate Shekhar's limited power without his support, as well as,
to show Shekhar who was really in charge.
In summary, India's stand on the Gulf crisis evolved around its own
self interest. A hope that she could prevent endangering her citizens in
the Gulf resulted in India's policy being quite indulgent to the Iraqi
regime. At the same time India saw itself between a need to assure the
safety of her citizens and to appease the international system by
denouncing Iraq's actions. While there are other reasons for these
positions—which will be discussed in the next chapter—the most crucial
to the development of her policy was presence of such a large number of
Indians in the Gulf region.
60
IV. REASONS FOR INDIA'S REACTIONS TO THE GOLF CRISIS
In discussing reasons for India's positions toward the Gulf crisis,
one must keep from viewing it only from a Western perspective. As the
U.S. viewed India's non-alignment position as a pro-communist stance in
the beginning of the cold war, it would be too simple to identify her
initial positions in the Gulf crisis as pro-Iraqi. It is too easy to
make the claim that India was on the wrong side of the coalition and
supportive of Iraq's invasion due to her initial stance on the crisis;
that her initial unwillingness to condemn Iraq and lack of a military
effort on the side of the coalition means she cannot be trusted to uphold
the international laws she repeatedly espouses. Hence, it is necessary
to carefully examine her positions in order to identify expectations of
India's future role in the region.
India's actions in this crisis must be viewed from her own
self-interest. As history has shown, her policies across the board show
a clear tendency to take action in that light on all issues—with much
disregard for the desires of the international community. With this in
mind, many would criticize India's non-involvement as a weakness due to
her desires for a greater regional role in the Indian Ocean and repeated
attempts to keep the superpowers out of the region. Both of
these—especially the first—may have been facilitated by a strong Indian
military effort preempting the U.S. response. Whether or not this is a




One cannot fault India for standing up for its right to decide issues
based upon self-interest. All nations have that right and most expressed
it during this crisis. Some nations leaders defied the will of their
people by taking sides based on a hope for future personal prestige or
economic and military assistance. This was clearly obvious in the
"participation" in the military effort by countries like Turkey and
Pakistan. Both countries faced crucial internal political and public
dissension directly resulting from their positions on the Gulf crisis and
their gains will likely be limited—especially Pakistan's.
Regarding the U.S. participation it would be quite easy to visualize
an administration in the U.S. that would not have taken such a strong
position in the crisis—especially had there not been oil in Kuwait. In
addition, would Washington's refusal to allow aggression have been as
strong if the Chinese had annexed Bhutan or Nepal? It is difficult to
envision a military force of 500 thousand U.S. servicemen being deployed
to force the Chinese out of one of these nations—even if requested by
one of the other countries in the region.
This thesis does not attempt to place blame upon any facet of the
Indian administration for its positions, it seeks only to examine
reasons, for the positions she expressed. While many nations have
faulted India for the elusiveness of her initial stand on Iraq's
aggression, as well as the see-saw of her policies regarding refueling of
U.S. aircraft, this chapter attempts to show that her initial position
was in line with her national interests and the issue of refueling
developed into a political game by India's "two" Prime Ministers and any
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judgement based on that issue must be underscored with an understanding
of the political situation.
India's unwillingness to accept criticism of her positions is in
keeping with her staunch refusal to allow her policies to be determined
from abroad. However, Gujral's rejection of a suggestion in the early
phase of the conflict from the parliament that India's Prime Minister
should personally contact Saddam Hussein, for fear that Hussein would
want to know India's position on the invasion, clearly implies an
understanding in India about how questionable its position was being
viewed abroad, as well as, what her true position was regarding the
invasion. Additionally, her strong support of the U.N. sanctions and
continuous enunciation of this fact expresses a hope that the
international community would realize the negative ramifications for
India of an outright condemnation of Iraq
—
yet at the same time accept
that she was against and did not recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.
There are as many reasons for India to have participated militarily in
this conflict and initially condemned the invasion as there are for her
eventual actions.
This chapter will focus on the following areas and attempt to explain








India and the Soviet Union
63
A. INDIAN GOVERNMENT
A full discussion of Indian politics is beyond the scope of this
chapter. This section will briefly examine the change of governments
from the Congress Party to the coalition government and how this change
has affected Indian foreign policy.
The Congress Party has ruled India for the majority of time since its
independence. It was only natural that this party and its leader
Nehru—in the forefront of Indian independence—take the helm in 1947.
Though opposition to Congress rule has been growing since the 1950' s, it
has had limited influence due to an inability of the opposition forces to
to solve disputes between themselves. The passing of the hat in Congress
has only been interrupted for a brief period in the late 70' s. This
followed a disgruntled two year period, from 1975 to 1977, of emergency
rule established by Indira Gandhi due to a rise in militancy and a
perceived threat to her power. Indira's return to power in 1980 was
facilitated by the inability of the coalition to effectively face
internal issues and a high degree of factionalism within the coalition.
The wave of sympathy following her assassination in October 1984 led to a
sweeping victory for Rajiv Gandhi, whom many hoped would lead India into
the 21st century.
Rajiv's administration was able to claim some successes in the
international arena. He was lauded for India's intervention in the
Maldives to put down an attempted coup, and gained international prestige
for India's role in Sri Lanka—though that has proved to be somewhat of a
military failure for India. However, he failed to improve much on the
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home front. His attempts to play power politics, like his mother,
resulted in further alienation of the opposition and much back stabbing
within his party. The blackening of Rajiv's "Mr. Clean" image came in
1987 as a result of discovery of "kickbacks amounting to 300 million
rupees (approximately $25 million) in a defense deal" from the Bofors
Company of Sweden. IRef 63: p. 119] Bofors, which had won a contract to
sell howitzers to India, is reported to have paid large sums to public
officials in India—even possibly the Prime Minister. Concerned over
increasing corruption within the Congress party, Singh resigned as
India's Defense Minister. Suddenly he became "the symbol of integrity,
the guardian and upholder of public norms, and a possible alternative to
Rajiv Gandhi." [Ref 63: p. 1191 The evidence of this—though not the only
issue—became a reality as Congress party was unable to achieve a
majority in the 1989 election and turned over power to the Coalition of
the National Front Government.
The coalition of the Centrist National Front government—of three
specific parties—was masterminded by VP Singh as a viable alternative to
the corrupt Congress party. Only winning 142 of a total of 529 seats,
less than the 196 seats won by Congress, the National Front Government
required the support of two ideologically diverse parties— the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) and the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM)—to
form a Government. Though these two gave their support to the National
Front they did not expressly become a part of the National Front
Alliance. This is likely due to an unwillingness to join a government
which includes the other. Thus the three parties, " united mainly by
their antipathy to Rajiv Gandhi and their calculation that a stint in
65
power, or near power, will bolster their future electoral prospects,"
[Ref 22:p.l8] made their unity very fragile at best. As recent history
indicated, these groups were able to put aside their differences long
enough to put the government in the history books, but as the coalition
government which held power from 1977-1979, the trouble started almost
from the very day it officially took power.
This government was doomed to fail. The inability to take a stand on
any issue without fearing a loss of support from one or both of its
factions made the government truly unable to take positions with
confidence of at least majority support. It required her to carefully
step around issues such that she would appease all factions of the
coalition. This was specifically evidenced by the heat the Prime
Minister took on both the Ayooda Temple issue and the job reservation
7
issue. The uproar created in parliament over these two issues crossed
all party lines and are both linked to the governments downfall.
This issue is at the center of communal problems in India today.
The Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Mas j id shrine is a mosque built by the first
Mughal emperor, Babur, in the 16th century. It is built at the
birthplace of the Indian Lord Rama, and Hindu's claim that the mosque was
built by demolishing the temple. The issue has repeatedly surfaced over
the past 350 years as Hindu's attempt to have the temple rebuilt. The
recent push by Hindu fundamentalist groups to have the temple rebuilt by
destroying the mosque. The government's inability to find an acceptable
solution to the problem has allowed it to develop into a major political
issue. For a better account, see United News of India, UNI Backgrounder,
vol. 12, no. 11, 12 March 1987 and vol. 14, no. 40, 5 October 1989.
7
The job reservation issue is India's attempt at equal opportunity.
The implementation of a program to reserve a larger percentage of
government jobs for lower class Indians. There is an acceptance by all
government parties for the need of this legislation, however the actual
percentages of jobs and who they apply to it at question.
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The invasion of Kuwait came at an inopportune moment for India's
government. The Prime Minister was faced with crucial problems at home
which could at any time have caused him his office. Hence the burden for
shouldering India's foreign policy towards the Gulf was placed in the
hands of the foreign minister I. K. Gujral. Realizing that the problems
on the home front were escalating beyond control, Gujral took action that
would keep from further upsetting the delicate situation and if possible
help the government stay in power. Hence the dramatic efforts by India
to ensure the safety, well being, and evacuation of its citizens in the
Gulf. This was the issue most crucial to the parliament regarding the
Gulf crisis evidenced by the number of "walkouts" by various
parliamentary personnel on various occasions in response to perceived
deficiencies in the governments actions in this regard.
The belief that Iraq was a good friend to India and the statements by
Iraq that it would aid the Indians in the region helped justify India's
soft position at the onset of the crisis. That concern over the Indians
in the region was paramount in the desires of the parliamentary members
is evidenced from the cheering that Gujral received after informing the
parliament of his actions regarding the safety of Indians in the Gulf
during his trips to Moscow, Washington, and Baghdad. There were no
members of parliament criticizing the government for not condemning
Iraq' 8 invasion with the exception of opposition leader, Rajiv Gandhi,
who repeatedly made attempts to improve his own image at the expense of
the incumbent party. However, as previously discussed, as the realities
of Iraqi concern about the Indians in the Gulf began to surface, and the
number of Indians in the region began to decline, Indian criticism
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Iraq became stronger but the government's inability to stay in power
preempted what might have resulted in a token military contribution or
medical unit, indicative of India's true feelings on the act of
aggression. Her policies from that point on were reduced to a political
struggle between two individuals competing for power and personal
prestige.
After the government's fall, Gandhi countered the president's request
that he attempt to form a government by committing his support to Chandra
Shekhar—who had split from the National Front government. Gandhi
claimed an unwillingness to form a government without the people's
mandate. Yet, his hesitation is realistically viewed as an attempt to
prevent from further damaging his image by showing his ineptness at
handling the issues which had brought down VP Singh. Shekhar* s attempts
to bring India back into the forefront in international affairs and
continuing the policies that Gujral had established failed due to
Gandhi's actions. Specifically the refueling issue, which was greatly
appreciated by the U.S. and its allies—including the Arab countries
—
was a perfect opportunity for India to remove any doubts about its stand
on Iraq's aggression. However, Gandhi's repeated calls for a cessation
of refueling activities, on the basis that it violated India's
non-alignment policy, ended up alienating the Arab governments—although
it appears that the West, especially the U.S., has realized the political
complexities surrounding the issue.
Though Gandhi did not pull his support for Shekhar, he attempted to
use the basis of his support to pull the strings to make the Prime
Minister abide by his wishes. Shekhar, s surprise resignation clearly
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indicated his unwillingness to be forced to play the game as a puppet.
Gandhi's actions may cause the Congress party some problems in the coming
election as the reasons for his actions are publicized.
Elected Governments—regardless of their position on the ideological
spectrum—all have the similar goal of improving the lot of their people
and increasing the prestige of their country. The coalition created by
VP Singh was not ideologically different in its views from the Congress
party. Nor were the members of the coalition divided in their ultimate
goals. What prevented the success of the coalition in its actions
revolved around personality problems and attempts by members of the
government to gain the "political edge" in their play for more power.
As Pakistan and India were unable to put aside their regional
problems in view of an international crisis, so were power hungry Indian
politicians unable to put aside their personal ambitions to work towards
the greater common good of all India. The leaders of the coalition took
steps towards the Gulf to prevent the coalition's downfall—which
eventually occurred, but not as a direct result of India's Gulf stance
—
and to maintain stability in the country.
Since it is difficult to blame political leaders for wanting to stay
in power, it is hard to fault the VP Singh government for its position in
the Gulf. While direct action in the Gulf may have improved India's
security role in the Indian Ocean, it may have also exacerbated internal
and regional problems which are of utmost importance to India's populous
and definitely more crucial to maintaining the government's power. A
political leader in India with more support in parliament would have been
able to take a stand on a broader level and as previous Indian
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governments have done, balance the attention given to internal and
external problems—but that was not the case during the Gulf crisis and
hence the issue of international prestige and India's world image did not
likely play a big part in the policy making of India's political elite.
B. HINDO-MUSLIH PROBLEMS
Though considered a secular society—where all religions are free to
live and prosper—India has been plagued with years of communal violence,
especially between Hindus and Muslims. Islam first arrived in India in
the 8th century, brought by Arab traders and marauders from the Middle
East. In the eyes of these invaders, the Hindu's were infidels "...whose
only options were Islam or death." tRef 64: p. 27] India spent many
centuries under Islamic rule of the Mughal Emperors. The manner by which
many Hindu's were forced to convert and the attempts by some to regain
power in various stages in India is evidence of the deep seated problems
between these two religious groups. Current problems between the two
developed in the early 1900 's as the Muslim leaders in India began to
envision a separate state of Pakistan for Indian Muslims. This dream
became a reality during the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in
1947.
The creation of Pakistan has been the underlying cause for the
present day Muslim-Hindu problems in India. The mass exodus of Hindu's
from Pakistan and Muslims from India following Independence in 1947 was
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wrought with extreme violence as many were killed on the roads between
the two countries. The two nations have fought two wars in 1947 and in
1965 over Kashmir—a Muslim majority state which acceded to India after
independence. Both countries have expended vast amounts of financial and
material assets attempting to counter one another. Both—especially
Pakistan—have allowed their foreign policies to be largely a reaction to
positions taken by the other.
Pakistan's refusal to accept that Kashmir is a part of India is
partly to support its claim that Muslims cannot live in a Hindu majority
nation and thus justify its reasons for existence. Conversely, India
cannot allow the loss of Kashmir for it would refute its position that
she is a secular nation, as well as increase secessionist desires in
other states in the country. These ideological differences between the
two nations have carried over into internal problems for India.
India's internal Muslim problems have been many. Successive
governments have had to step carefully around Muslim issues in order to
ensure keeping the Muslim vote. Religion has gradually become a greater
part of electoral politics as different factions vie for support based on
religious differences. Multiple concessions made to Muslim
fundamentalist in India over the years have caused repeated problems
between Hindus and Muslims and made many questions the validity of
India's secular claim.
The most recent problems between the two factions centers over the
Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Mas j id, the birth place of the Indian God Lord Rama.
The agitation resurfaced in the early 1980 's as a rapidly growing Hindu
party the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) took the reconstruction of the
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temple as its major objective. While an interim decision by the courts
ruled to maintain the status quo, the VHP pushed for construction and
claimed the decision was beyond the powers of the judicial system to
make.
Another pro Hindu Party, the BJP party delayed VHP from beginning
construction in February 1990 for 4 months to give the government time to
come to a decision. It is interesting to note that the BJP was
supportive of the Singh coalition and is a right wing Hindu
fundamentalist party. It had grown from attaining two seats in
parliament in 1984 to over 80 in 1989. This attempt to improve its image
on this clearly major Hindu-Muslim issue is an indication of its desire
for a bigger role in future governments in India. [Ref 651
This will be significant in the upcoming elections and may favor the
BJP which is running an independent ticket for the first time ever in
Indian elections. This is also a crucial test for India's secularism and
will surely be cause for future Hindu-Muslim riots in India—if an
amicable solution cannot be found.
Political moves abounded around the temple-mosque issue. As
indicated the BJP sought to increase its prestige by fueling Hindu
desires to build the temple. The Singh government attempted to maintain
its support of the Muslim community and the Hindu's by pushing for an
amicable solution and not taking a definite stand on the issue. Rajiv
Gandhi, who in 1989 had pushed for the construction of the temple in a
failed attempt to gain the Hindu vote—actually ending up alienating both
Hindus and Muslims—took a center line stance by espousing support for
construction of a temple without disturbing the mosque. All of these
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positions will have an effect on future elections yet an acceptable
solution to the problem can only arise from an understanding between the
religious leaders of both communities.
In the past Indian governments have been supportive of the Muslim
issues in an attempt to justify its claim as a secular country. The
possibility of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait being supported by the Muslims
in the Gulf and in India was very high as evidenced by demonstrations
throughout the region. Hence, India's positions on the crisis could have
had exacerbated already tense Hindu-Muslim problems and have caused
Muslim leaders to pull their support for the National Front Government.
The government took an initial position that was most beneficial to
itself and its attempt to curtail increased communal violence in the
country
.
C. HISTORICAL POSITIONS ON ARAB NORLD
India has for years been supportive of the Arab world, linking its
own struggle for independence to that of support for Arab nationalism and
the right to self determination, as well, as to support for the Arab
position on the Arab-Israeli dispute. [Ref 66: p. 60-78] In a more
localized context this support was based on appeasing its own Muslim
population and countering Pakistan's influence in the Middle East.
However, the return for India's support of Arab issues—including but
not limited to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, concern for
Palestinian rights, and opposition to CENTO—has not been as great as
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hoped. The limited pro-Indian positions during the Sino-Indian conflict
in 1962 and expressed sympathy for Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971
conflicts has increased India's public animosity toward these countries.
Specifically, "when the government of India, once again, openly sided
with the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967, the popular uproar
was an indication of the public's keen awareness of how the Arab states
let India down in her hour of need." [Ref 67: p. 59]
The invasion of Kuwait could have easily developed into an
Arab-Israeli problem. This is evidenced by U.S. pressure upon Israel to
refrain from responding to attempts by Iraq to provoke Israeli military
action in hopes of fracturing the coalition. Whether an Israeli response
would have caused the alliance to disintegrate at that stage in the
crisis is immaterial—for by then India had denounced Iraq's action and
was aiding the U.S. effort by refueling aircraft. Yet, while successful
diplomacy by the U.S. prevented this from occurring, there was no way of
knowing the outcome in the early stages of the crisis. Hence, India's
initial position was along the lines of its historical position on
Arab-Israeli problems and the gradual changes in her position resulting
from realization that the annexation was not being supported by the Arab
governments nor was it developing into an Arab-Israeli dispute.
It is difficult to assess India's position on the basis of past
actions on Arab issues. This crisis caused a major division amongst the
Arab states as it was initially an inter-Arab dispute. India's support
of the Arabs against the U.S. and Israel would be justification of her
positions based upon a Western created alliance in the region.
However—regardless of any strong arming by the U.S.—the U.S.'s presence
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in Saudi Arabia was at the request of the Saudi regime. Hence, any
linkage of the crisis to the Arab-Israeli issue or to support of the
Arabs against western influence was null and void. Additionally,
India's limited historical success with securing support of the Arab
regimes vis a vis its own conflicts, further nullifies any expectation
that she acted based upon past precedents in the region. However, more
importantly in this conflict might otherwise have been India's long
standing friendship with Iraq—a friendship she would not want to
lose—but yet not one which she would allow to undermine her support for
international law. Hence, it is difficult to make the claim that India's
historical support for the Arab world led her to be soft on Iraq's
annexation. More likely New Delhi's position was based on a fear that
Indian citizens would be placed in jeopardy as a result of condemning
Iraqi actions.
D. INDIA VS PAKISTAN
India's regional problems with Pakistan could have also been a player
in India's non-participation in the crisis. In a private conversation
with LT. Robert Clark, USN, who had interviewed an official at the Indian
Embassy in Hashington, D.C., he made the claim that India was not
involved militarily because "she was not asked by the Saudi 's." Though
unproven it is quite possible that Pakistan—upon acceding to the Saudi
request to send help—requested that the Saudi 's not include India in the
military effort against Iraq. Though the Saudi' s may have liked to
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include India in their defense—whether or not India would have sent a
force is another question—they may have honored Pakistan's request when
realizing the Western involvement would preclude the need of Indian
forces. Though their is no proof for this claim—as it would likely be
at the highest levels of classification in Pakistan—surely the
Pakistanis, who have been on opposite sides of almost every issue with
India, would not be able to see themselves fighting alongside India
against anyone. In addition, Indian military involvement would have
equated India and Pakistan in the eyes of the West and undermined
Pakistan's attempt to regain its status with Western countries, a
position which has deteriorated due to the end of the cold war.
B. GLOBALISH VS REGIONALISM
India's belief that she was a "beacon of light" for all third world
countries, led to an establishment of an outward looking policy by Nehru.
His attempts at mediation in various conflicts including the Suez crisis
and the Korean war are evidence of his belief of India as a world
peacemaker. Prime Ministers after Nehru have tended to continue this
global approach to affairs due to their perception of India as a great
power.
However, there has been a gradual but definite shift in emphasis,
from the world focus to countries nearer to home in the implementation of
Indian policies. IRef 68] During a 1974 visit to India by the Shah of
Iran, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi publicly agreed with him that
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"safeguarding stability and power in the Gulf was the exclusive right of
the littoral states." [Ref 16: p. 177] This move was supported by many in
India who had not foreseen India becoming the great power envisioned by
Nehru.
Comparing the compulsions of Indian decision makers in the Nehru,
Indira Gandhi, and the Rajiv Gandhi eras, we find that in the Nehru
days the subcontinental power relationship were unimportant and
Delhi's ties with the great powers were of central importance.
Secondly, the interface between domestic problems (threats to the
political system and threats to territorial integrity) and external
problems were not a direct one in the India-China border clash or
when Indira Gandhi decided to intervene in the Bangladesh crisis
(1971). This interface surfaced in the late 1970' s and the early
1980* s. It is revealed in a big way in the Indian Punjab/Pakistan
and Tamil/Sri Lankan situations. As a result of the interface, the
approach of the Indira and Rajiv Gandhi governments to the regional
foreign affairs became a manifestation of the approach from Globalism
to Regionalism in foreign affairs. [Ref 68: p. 7081
The Singh government was "...on the whole less ambitious in its
foreign policy..." [Ref 69: p. 9341 and increased its efforts to improve
relations in South Asia. "Greater priority has been given to India's
'immediate' regional policy as compared with its broader relations with
global powers." [Ref 69: p. 934] In the words of I. K. Gujral, India's
foreign minister,
India's new foreign policy aims to harmonize itself with the era
of peace... The long term foreign policy is to create a tension-free
regional environment for India which would release funds from the
Defense Budget for economic growth. . . India would strive to create an
atmosphere of cooperation in South Asia and would work with SAARC as
an equal partner. [Ref 36: p. 35]
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These statements illustrate a growing concern for the region and a
focussing of Indian foreign relations to regional issues in an attempt to
take the South Asian region into the 21st century. This changing
direction of India's foreign policies is also evidenced by Gujral's
statements in the UAE regarding the Gulf crisis in October 1990.
Of course this does not mean that the government "will reject force
in case of grave changes at the regional level that threaten India's
national interest; nor should one think that the new government is
against India becoming a mighty regional power." [Ref 69: p. 935] It
implies that India is not apt to be as concerned about events outside
South Asia—unless they directly affect her national interests and
security—until a time when she can legitimately claim herself the
predominant nation in South Asia. Hence, the events in the Gulf were
outside of India's region of desired influence and her participation was
not apt to further the new foreign policy desires of the administration.
F. INDIAN MILITARY
India's military forces have developed into one of the worlds
largest. The recent expansion of India's navy has been cause for concern
throughout the Indian Ocean as many question India's desires and
intentions. There has been much written about India's hegemonic desires
throughout the region and in this context her military participation in a
crisis so near to her borders would have been expected. However, there
are various factors which stood in the way of India's military
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involvement—factors more pressing to the current environment in South
Asia than a desire for greater influence in the Gulf.
India has only recently withdrawn its troops from Sri Lanka. Given
that their employment has been a major disappointment for the Indian
Army, has likely made India very wary of getting involved militarily in
any conflict so soon after withdrawing from Sri Lanka. This is evidenced
by the blind eye she has turned to the continued violence in Sri Lanka,
and indifference partly designed to improve relations with that country.
Military involvement in the Gulf would have done little to assuage the
fears of her South Asian neighbors regarding India's ongoing military
build up. On the contrary, claiming that she was against the use of
force between nations and that her foreign policy did not support sending
troops abroad would improve her standing in South Asia and might help
dispel some of the anxiety in South Asia of her willingness to use force
unnecessarily
.
Independent India has refrained from joining military alliances. The
view that these alliances prohibited a nation's independent action has
been a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy since its inception. While
the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict forced India to seek military aid, she has
attempted to diversify her sources in order to maintain her freedom of
action. The realities of this freedom are not as impressive as the
idealistic desires but yet it has been a point to strive for. Thus
participation in the coalition where she was not the leading member would
have been viewed in New Delhi as possibly jeopardizing her independence
of action, a restriction unacceptable to India.
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India has never supported the U.S. military presence in the Indian
Ocean. Several factors possibly influenced New Delhi's military
calculation during the Gulf crisis: first, as the U.S. presence in Saudi
Arabia was assured shortly after the invasion, India's military efforts
would have likely been only a token; second, joining the coalition would
have given approval to the U.S. build-up and even worse, as far as New
Delhi was concerned, a possible permanent presence in the region. This
would have violated many of India's long standing policies on the issue
of foreign forces in the Indian Ocean and definitely caused a major stir
in the parliament.
These issues must also be examined with regards to their timing.
India's involvement initially was not likely in the circumstances
—
especially with a coalition government. It is likely that any Indian
government would have waited to see how events were developing prior to
committing forces against her long time friend. As previously discussed,
she may have actually gotten involved had the VP Singh government not
fallen. For although Shekhar eventually briefly participated in the
effort against Iraq—based on bilateral relations with the U.S.—the
involvement was curtailed by Rajiv Gandhi's political play to recapture
the Muslim vote and to improve his own image at the expense of the Prime
Minister
.
Another factor with regard to India's military has been the lack of a
National Security Council. India has traditionally viewed Pakistan and
China as the only real military threats to her national security.
Additionally, the vacuum at the top of her military infrastructure has
prevented a close working relationship between the three services and an
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identification of future threats to India's security given the rapidly
changing external environment.
The obvious need for this has been foreseen as the NSC was initiated
in late August 1990 to "take a comprehensive and coordinated view on all
matters relating to the countries security." [Ref 70] This type of
institution is paramount for a nation like India, who needs to develop
definitive strategies with regards to future conflicts in the Indian
Ocean. The presence of such a body and the information it provides would
have better prepared the Indians for a situation like the Gulf crisis.
6. INDIA AND TOE SOVIET ONION
India's foreign policy has not adjusted to the fall of the Soviets
from superpower status. Indian officials may have felt that if the
Soviets stepped in to force Iraq to return to the status quo then India
would have prevailed by not having condemned Iraq's actions and thus not
jeopardizing her long standing friendship with Iraq. However, India
misjudged the Soviet's influence—for had the Soviets really had
influence in Iraq, Sadaam probably could have been prevented from even
going into Kuwait.
That India's view of the Soviet Union had not changed is also
evidenced by the weight given to the Soviet peace proposals and India's
support of them in the Indian press. A last minute trip to the Soviet
Union by Gandhi to bring the crisis to a peaceful resolution was more or
less snubbed in the Soviet Union as Gorbachev clearly claimed the utmost
81
value of maintaining relations with the U.S. over any attempt to counter
the U.S. moves. [Ref 71:p.361 From the Indian perspective the Soviet
move shed a great deal of light upon the future of the Soviet's role in
the world.
India's unwillingness to accept the Soviets demise would have been
one reason for her positions in the crisis. The problem for India is
that the current politicians are too involved with maintaining power than
evaluating the changing external environment. A coalition government
more concerned with maintaining its role has little time to reflect upon
changes in the world, when faced with daily threats to its very
existence. India needs to rethink her policies with regards to a world
with one superpower—whose willingness to allow regional powers to
prevail regionally will be based on their support of the superpower. "It
is becoming clear to the Indian leadership that in an increasingly
Uni-Polar world, India will have to learn to coexist with dignity with
the U.S." [Ref 71:p.35] What has to be worked out is how the world will
reorganize and restructure itself in the new system.
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V. CONCLUSION
Indians have since independence spoken of the desire to participate
in the world as a major power. However, the realities of a weak internal
economy and rapidly changing global and regional environment have forced
Indian leaders to focus greater attention on events closer to home.
While successive Prime Ministers, after Nehru, have continued to face
foreign policy issues from a global perspective, they have had to
concentrate more and more effort on problems in South Asia.
The crisis in the Gulf caught the Indians at a time when its
government had determined that its foreign policy would evolve around
affairs in South Asia. As discussed earlier in the paper, while this is
not a change in how governments since Indira Gandhi have focussed their
policies, it is a drastic change from the Nehruvian view—a view which
most people relate to India—of India's role in the world.
Given this changing focus—one which most outside of India would not
have realized—India's response to the Gulf crisis should have been
expected. Her involvement in the Gulf crisis would have done little to
help improve relations in South Asia and the costs of a military
deployment would have exacerbated an already heavy economic burden.
While India can be counted on to directly face issues which affect
her national security, it is less likely that she will involve herself in
conflicts outside the South Asian region. This does not mean that India
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will not live up to its responsibilities in the international arena, only
that her first priorities will be to South Asia.
As relations between India and the U.S. continue to improve, both
countries will benefit from ensuring stability in Pakistan and of course
working for stability in India as well. While reducing U.S. aid to
Pakistan may prompt closer Pakistan-Chinese ties, continued U.S. pressure
upon China concerning arms shipments to Pakistan and closer Indo-Sino
relations might induce Pakistan to improve ties with India.
Additionally, improving economic relation in South Asia may eventually
lead to greater interdependence between the two countries—though
Pakistan will likely never accept India's role as a regional policeman.
At the time of writing, India is in the midst of its tenth general
election. After the first day of elections it appeared that the Congress
Party under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi was headed for a victory
—
though not with a majority in the lower house. Since the other parties
are unlikely to form a coalition, Congress would probably be asked to
form a government.
However, a most tragic development occurred on 21 Hay 1991, in the
southern Indian state of Tamilnadu, with the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi. While the government is hesitant to point the finger at any
particular group of people for fear of escalating violence in the
country, and no group has officially claimed responsibility for the
killing, it is believed that the assassination can be linked to Tamil
Tiger revolutionaries in Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu. Rajiv Gandhi had been
instrumental in setting up the 1987 accord with Sri Lanka and in
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dispatching the Indian peace keeping force to the island—as was his
mother in helping to create the rebel organizations.
Mr. Gandhi's assassination has left India's politics in turmoil and
India without an internationally known candidate for Prime Minister and
has ended for the time being, the presence of a member of the Nehru
legacy in Indian politics. While the possibility exists for his son or
daughter to eventually enter politics—both are currently too young and
inexperienced.
The future of Indian politics is quite uncertain. Yet this
assassination is further justification for India to focus its efforts to
correct its internal and regional problems before attempting to develop
its greater international role. This claim is further supported by the
fact that regardless of what party wins the elections, their ability to
stay in power will be based on the strength with which they tackle
internal and regional affairs. There can be no doubt that India will
eventually emerge as a major world actor. The ability to peacefully
change governments and survive this most recent tragedy attests to the
strength of the Indian democracy and the resilience of the Indian people.
There seems to be an evolving U.S. tilt towards India. This is
enhanced by cooling U.S. -Pakistan ties and U.S. pressure upon China to
reduce military aid to Pakistan. However, despite India's apparent
changing foreign policy which calls for warmer relations with its South
»
Asian neighbors, one must not too readily forget New Delhi's willingness
to use both military and economic superiority as a weapon to coerce
regional countries to see things from an Indian perspective.
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Improved relations between India and the U.S. are a must for India.
Due to the collapse of the Soviets, India is now in need of U.S.
assistance to continue the development of her economic and military
infrastructure. Additionally, India may require the assistance of the
U.S. in deterring Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and in preventing a
conflict on the subcontinent where she may find herself combating both
China and Pakistan.
Given these factors, It is India who must learn to live within what
appears to be a Unipolar world. The U.S. must keep from enhancing
India's hegemonic capabilities at the expense of being considered a
partner to India's actions. The realities of a post cold war world will
give the U.S. greater freedom to work closely with India to ensure its
eventual emergence as a global power are founded on principles which are
acceptable to the international community, and not merely upon an ability
to project influence as an act of coercion.
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APPENDIX
Indian Naval Growth Since Independence
1947-48 1965-66 1971-72
Total Strength: 11,000 Total Strength: 16 ,000 Total Strength: 40,000
4 sloops 1 carrier 1 carrier
2 frigates 2 cruisers 4 submarines
1 corvette 3 destroyers 2 cruisers
12 fit minesweepers 5 ASW frigates 3 destroyers
4 trollers 3 AAW frigates 9 destroyer escorts
4 mtr minesweepers 6 escort ships 1 gen purpose frigates
4 mtr launches 6 minesweepers 5 ASU frigates
1 survey ship 13 It cstl vessels 3 AAW frigates
2 amphibious vesseIs 10 patrol boats
5 survey/trg vesseIs 4 cstl minesweepers
4 inshr minesweepers
3 landing ship/craft




















18 support and misc
20 mine countermeasure
10 amphibious vessels
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